In Gilbert v. National Corp. for Housing Partnerships (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1240, an actual conflict of interest existed. The attorney, who would eventually be disqualified, proposed to represent both a current litigant and former litigants who, in settling with the plaintiff, had signed confidentiality agreements. It was in the current client's interest to have the settled parties disclose as much information as possible, yet a thorough disclosure by the settled parties would have subjected them to a breach of confidentiality claim. This presented a clear conflict for the attorney who anticipated representing both. The California Supreme Court set forth the standard of review we apply in a case such as this. The court stated, "a trial court's determination of the historical basis of the transactions--in common parlance, what happened--raises a question of fact. (As explained above, however, in this case those facts are largely undisputed. ) The question, however, of the legal characteristics of that transaction, i.e., whether it was subject to the usury law, requires an application of law to the facts. . . . The determination in the present case of whether the debt restructuring is a loan subject to the usury law, rather than being an exempt transaction of a different character, is such a question. We conclude it is a question of law subject to independent review." ( Id. at p. 801.) In short, an attorney who successfully represented employees in a discrimination and harassment action brought against their employer was found to be disqualified from representing another employee in a similar case against the employer. ( Gilbert, supra, 71 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 1243-1244.) Gilbert held that the settlement agreement reached in the first action, which required the parties " 'to keep the fact of this Settlement and this Agreement, and each of its terms, strictly confidential,' " and specified severe sanctions for breach of the confidentiality provision ( id. at pp. 1245, 1252), created a conflict of interest that justified an order disqualifying the attorney from representing the other employee ( id. at pp. 1243, 1252-1254).