In Glynn v. Marquette (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 277, the Court of Appeal explained that Civil Code section 3395 "is designed to prevent a seller from arbitrarily frustrating the buyer's remedy of specific performance by conveying the property to a third person who has notice of the buyer's interest. " (Id. at p. 281.) The dispute between MCCE and the City does not implicate the concern addressed by Civil Code section 3395, i.e., preserving a buyer's specific performance remedy when property is conveyed to a third party by a seller. In any event, the statute "does not render the third party liable in damages for other types of promises of the seller" and does not apply to a "promise to pay the prevailing party's attorney's fees in the event of litigation on the contract." (Ibid.) The prevailing party has an adequate remedy at law by seeking attorney fees from the party to the contract. There is consequently no need to require a successor property owner to specifically perform the attorney fee provision of the contract. (Ibid.) Civil Code section 3395 merely provides a limited form of relief for buyers but does not make a successor property owner a party to the contract between a buyer and seller. (See id. at p. 282.)