In Granucci v. Claasen (1928) 204 Cal. 509, 269 P. 437, the court reversed a directed verdict granted in favor of a defendant who had constructed a wooden driveway on which the plaintiff had tripped and fallen when her shoe had caught on something in an area where there were loose boards. The facts included that in San Francisco in 1912 a cement sidewalk had been laid along Mission Street except for a distance of approximately nine feet opposite the entrance to a building on defendant's lot. Under a special permit, the defendant had caused to be constructed a driveway composed of wooden planks and stringers, secured by spikes. The surface of the driveway was flush with the level of the sidewalk. The driveway "during the ten years of its existence, with the exception of a brief intermission, had been used and passed over daily by more or less heavy trucks and horse-drawn vehicles in connection with the use of said premises as a brewery and later as a coffee mill. During that entire period, according to the testimony both of the owner of said premises and of her son, the lessee thereof, the driveway had never been subjected to any sort of repair." (Granucci, at p. 513.) The court stated: "This driveway having been thus constructed and used not primarily for sidewalk purposes but for the benefit and convenience of the said defendants in connection with their adjacent property and which use was one which was independent of and apart from the ordinary and accustomed use for which sidewalks are designed, the duty was cast by law upon the defendants to exercise reasonable care and diligence in the keeping of said driveway at the point where it was superimposed upon said sidewalk in a proper and safe condition for the passage of pedestrians rightfully using said sidewalk and said driveway superimposed by defendants thereon." (Granucci, supra, 204 Cal. at p. 512) The court rejected the argument of the defendants that because the portion of the wooden driveway upon which the plaintiff had tripped and fallen was also a portion of the public sidewalk, constructed with the permission of the board of public works, the duty to maintain the area was the responsibility of the public entity rather than the defendants, or at the least they were not liable because they had not been notified pursuant to provisions of the municipal charter to repair the driveway. The court stated: "In making this contention the defendants misconceive the meaning and application of the aforesaid provisions of the charter in their relation to the facts of the instant case, since the portion of said sidewalk upon which the defendants' driveway was superimposed was being used by said defendants not as a sidewalk nor primarily for the use and convenience of the general public, but that the same had been constructed and was being used by the defendants primarily as a driveway into their said premises and for their private use, convenience, and benefit. To such a state of facts the decision of this court in the case of Monsch v. Pellissier, has direct application." (Granucci, supra, 204 Cal. at p. 514.)