In Greene v. Bank of America (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 454, the Court concluded that the trial court should not have resolved the probable cause issue as a matter of law because there was a dispute as to the entire factual predicate for defendants' report to law enforcement. There, a bank refused to cash a check tendered by plaintiff Greene. After a heated exchange between Greene and the branch manager, the manager called police and reported that Greene had threatened to blow up the bank. Greene was arrested and charged with making a criminal threat. He was acquitted after a jury trial. (Id. at p. 457.) Following his acquittal, Greene sued the bank and the branch manager for malicious prosecution. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending that Greene could not establish a lack of probable cause as a matter of law. In support, defendants submitted declarations stating that Greene had become very agitated and shouted that "he was not afraid of the police, that he was 'going to blow shit up,' and that he was an ex-convict, and that he was not afraid to blow the place up or break the doors." (Id. at p. 460.) Greene opposed the motion, conceding that he had "vented" about the bank's poor customer service, but said he never threatened any person or bank property with physical harm. (Id. at pp. 459-460.) The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order granting the anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the factual dispute surrounding Greene's alleged threats to blow up the bank precluded dismissal as a matter of law. It explained: "'When, as here, the claim of malicious prosecution is based upon initiation of criminal prosecution, the question of probable cause is whether it was objectively reasonable for the defendant . . . to suspect the plaintiff . . . had committed a crime.'. . . As we have seen, there was a conflict of the evidence on whether the branch manager honestly believed that plaintiff had threatened to blow up the Bank, or whether she deliberately lied. If she lied, she did not have probable cause." (Id. at p. 466.)