In Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 566, plaintiff, the owner of a bar and restaurant damaged by fire brought suit against three companies that insured the premises against fire loss, an adjusting firm and one of its adjusters, and a law firm and its attorney-employee. The complaint alleged in essence, that the defendants wilfully and maliciously entered into a scheme to deprive plaintiff of benefits of the fire insurance policies in that they encouraged criminal charges by falsely implying that plaintiff had a motive to commit arson, and in that, knowing plaintiff would not appear for examination on the loss as required by the policies during the pendency of criminal charges against him, they used his failure to appear as a pretense for denying disability. The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the complaint. Plaintiff declined to amend and judgment of dismissal was entered. The Supreme Court in Gruenberg reversed the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant insurance companies and remanded the cause with directions to overrule the demurrer as to them. The court held that ". . . while the complaint is far from a model pleading, it does allege in substance a breach on the part of defendant insurance companies of their duty of good faith and fair dealing . . . ." which is implied in every insurance contract. (P. 575.) In Gruenberg, the sole basis of the complaint was the defendants' alleged breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every insurance contract. The Gruenberg court decided the issue of whether or not a noninsurer defendant, since not a party to the agreement of insurance, and therefore having no duty of good faith and fair dealing thereon, could be held liable on the theory of conspiracy to breach that duty. In so doing the court did not enunciate a rule exempting agents and employees from liability for all civil conspiracies. In this regard the court stated as to the noninsurer defendants: "Obviously, the non-insurer defendants were not parties to the agreements for insurance; therefore, they are not, as such, subject to an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing." It was in this regard that the court went on to say: "Moreover, as agents and employees of the defendant insurers, they cannot be held accountable on a theory of conspiracy." The court explained that this rule is derived from the principle that ". . . ordinarily corporate agents and employees acting for and on behalf of the corporation cannot be held liable for inducing a breach of the corporation's contract since being in a confidential relationship to the corporation their action in this respect is privileged." ( Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., supra, 9 Cal.3d 566, 576.) The California Supreme Court recognized a plaintiff's cause of action in tort for breach of the implied-in-law covenant against certain insurance company defendants. However, the same court concluded that certain other named defendants, although alleged to be agents of the insurers, were not parties to the contract, and, hence, "were not subject to the implied duty arising from the contractual relationship."