In Hampton v. Municipal Court (1966) 242 Cal. App. 2d 689, the appellant was stopped for a traffic violation. His driver's license had previously been revoked. He was issued a citation for driving without a license in his immediate possession, a violation of Vehicle Code section 12951, with an appearance date specified on May 25, 1965. Later, the prosecuting attorney discovered that appellant's license had previously been revoked and a complaint was filed charging appellant with violation of Vehicle Code section 14601, "a far more serious offense." (Hampton, supra, 242 Cal. App. 2d at p. 691.) Notice of the new charge was given to appellant with a hearing date of May 26, 1965. On the advice of counsel, appellant appeared on May 25, 1965, pled guilty to violation of Vehicle Code section 12951 and received a $ 25 fine. He then appeared on May 26 and moved that the charges be dropped because of his conviction the prior day. The motion was denied and appellant sought a writ in the superior court prohibiting the prosecution. That was denied and he appealed. The appellate court affirmed denial of the writ of prohibition. The appellate court noted that defendant's petition for writ of prohibition failed to set out what appellant had told the police officer about his license status. It stated that if appellant had told the officer he was driving with a revoked license it "would have made it clearly inappropriate for the officer to issue a citation requiring the citee to appear in court to answer a charge of violating section 12951." (Id. at p. 691.) The opinion also noted that at oral argument before the trial court on the motion to dismiss, "counsel for appellant stated that both he and appellant were aware of the fact that appellant was not a 'licensee' and therefore could not have been guilty of violating section 12951, but that the plea of guilty to this erroneous charge was entered by appellant for the sole purpose of barring the pending prosecution for the violation of section 14601." (Id. at p. 692.) The court explained its rationale in denying the petition as follows: '"Where a former conviction by plea of guilty was, by reason of fraud or collusion, a sham proceeding engineered by the accused for the purpose of defeating a subsequent prosecution, and resulted in the accused's procuring an inadequate penalty, the cases have generally held that it would not constitute a bar to the second prosecution on the accused for the same offense.' "Since appellant's statements and representations made at the time he received the citation in question and at the time he entered his plea of guilty thereto are not disclosed either by his petition or by any transcript of the proceedings, it might not be appropriate to say that he procured his 'conviction' fraudulently. However, the facts which he does disclose prove beyond any doubt that his 'conviction' was procured with his connivance and collusion. He frankly admits that his purpose in falsely pleading guilty to a trivial charge he knew to be inapplicable and paying a wholly inadequate penalty was to bar the prosecution of a pending charge which calls for a mandatory jail sentence , and an extension of the period during which the revocation of his license would continue ." (Id. at p. 693, )