In Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 614, an employee sued her former employer for disability discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). ( Govt. Code, 12940 et seq.) The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to a claim of mental impairment, when the plaintiff, in opposition to defendant's summary judgment motion, contended for the first time that her claimed disability of ulcerative colitis, as stated in her FEHA claim, was merely attendant to her true disability of depression and anxiety severe enough to constitute a qualifying mental disability. The appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the trial court properly concluded that the complaint's failure to allege mental disability rendered it insufficient as a matter of law because it was unsupported by an appropriate administrative charge. (74th Cal.App.4th at p. 630.) An administrative charge must be filed identifying with specificity the discrimination alleged and the facts supporting it, including the nature of the disability claimed, so as to supply fair notice of the facts sufficient to permit investigation. ( Id. at p. 630.) If an employee fails to file an administrative charge specifically identifying the alleged discrimination within one year of its occurrence, the subsequent lawsuit will be barred. ( Id. at p. 631; Govt. Code, 12960.) The record before the trial court disclosed that the alleged incidents of mental impairment were distinct from plaintiff's colitis, and that the theory of her claim did in fact shift by the time summary judgment was threatened. ( Hobson, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 631.) In fact, the appellate court noted, the plaintiff's own attorney conceded that he himself did not know his client was suffering from the newly asserted mental condition until after the complaint was filed. Therefore, "nothing in the charge could thus have reasonably been expected to lead to an investigation of whether the colitis was accompanied by or was merely a symptom of some other disability. Also, until the nature of her claimed disability was known, it would have been impossible to discern what reasonable accommodations she might have required and whether such accommodations had, in fact, been denied." ( Id. at p. 631.)