In Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, a student driving from a high school parking lot jumped the curb with his car and struck plaintiff Hoff on the sidewalk across the street. Concluding that neither the school district nor its employees owed a duty to Hoff, "a nonstudent who was not on school property at the time of the accident," the Supreme Court held Hoff could not pursue a negligence claim against the school district based on breach of a duty to supervise the student who drove into Hoff. (Ibid.) In Hoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th 925, the Supreme Court observed that "given the immaturity of teenage drivers, accidents caused by their reckless driving are statistically foreseeable. Yet the Legislature has concluded that the benefits to society from issuing them licenses outweigh the risks." ( Id. at p. 937.) The Court stated that "'As a general rule one has no duty to control the conduct of another, and no duty to warn those who may be endangered by such conduct. A duty may arise, however, where "(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection." ' 'This rule derives from the common law's distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, and its reluctance to impose liability for the latter. '" (Hoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 933.)In Hoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th 925, the Supreme Court observed that "'in some instances the relationship of school personnel to . . . students gives rise to a duty of care. . . . "While school districts and their employees have never been considered insurers of the physical safety of their students, California law has long imposed on school authorities a duty to 'supervise at all times the conduct of the children on the school grounds and to enforce those rules and regulations necessary to their protection. ' The standard of care imposed upon school personnel in carrying out this duty to supervise is identical to that required in the performance of their other duties. This uniform standard to which they are held is that degree of care 'which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with comparable duties, would exercise under the same circumstances.'"'" ( Id. at pp. 933-934.) The Supreme Court also observed: "In a number of cases, California courts have recognized that a student may recover for injuries proximately caused by a breach of this duty of supervision. However, before the Court of Appeal issued its opinion in this case, no reported California decision had considered whether the duty of student supervision that arises out of the relationship between school personnel and students may support recovery by nonstudents, like Hoff, who are injured off campus." ( Id. at p. 934.) In Hoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th 925, the Supreme Court observed that through various portions of the California Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, 810 et seq.), the Legislature has "'incorporated "general standards of tort liability as the primary basis for respondeat superior liability of public entities. . . ." ' Under them, 'a school district is vicariously liable for injuries proximately caused by the negligence' of school personnel 'responsible for student supervision.' Thus, the District's liability under Government Code section 815.2 depends on whether school personnel, by failing to supervise the student who was driving as he exited the overflow parking lot, breached a duty owed Hoff." (Hoff, at pp. 932-933.) Similarly, any liability of the District here depended upon whether by failing to supervise or control Smoot as he left the Grad Nite '98 event, District personnel breached a duty owed to plaintiffs. (Hoff, at p. 933.) In Hoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th 925, 934, in determining whether school district employees owed any duty to plaintiff Hoff on the facts of that case, the Supreme Court found it "instructive to consider the limits of the common law duty that parents owe third parties to supervise and control the conduct of their children." With respect to parental liability, the Supreme Court observed that "'knowledge of dangerous habits and ability to control the child are prerequisites to imposition of liability. ' 'Only the manifestation of specific dangerous tendencies . . . triggers a parental duty to exercise reasonable care to control the minor child in order to prevent . . . harm to third persons. '" ( Id. at p. 935.) Thus, the Supreme Court found it "appropriate to look to these limits on the common law parental duty of supervision in determining whether, on the facts of this case, any duty of District employees to supervise students ran to Hoff. The relationship between school personnel and students is analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children. At common law, 'school officials are said to stand in loco parentis, in the place of parents, to their students, with similar powers and responsibilities. ' Moreover, by statute, we measure school personnel's criminal liability for exercising physical control over students by the standard applicable to parents. Given these similarities, any duty that school employees owe off-campus nonstudents should at least be no greater in scope than the duty that parents owe third persons. Accordingly, school personnel who neither know nor reasonably should know that a particular student has a tendency to drive recklessly owe no duty to off-campus nonstudents." ( Id. at pp. 935-936.)