In Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, the Court considered whether an insurance carrier was required to defend its insured, a teacher, under an educator's liability policy after a minor student filed an action seeking damages stemming from the teacher's alleged sexual and nonsexual misconduct. (Id. at p. 1078.) Earlier, the teacher had pleaded nolo contendere in a separate criminal case to a count of violating Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). (Horace Mann, supra, at p. 1079.) The insurance company accepted tender of the teacher's defense of the minor's suit, reserving its rights to disclaim coverage or an obligation to defend. Thereafter, the insurance company filed a declaratory relief action seeking a determination of its duty to defend. (Id. at p. 1080.) The insurance company moved for summary judgment, arguing its policy did not provide coverage as a matter of law, because the teacher's conduct was intentional within the meaning of Insurance Code section 533 and was unrelated to educational activities. (Horace Mann, supra, at p. 1080.) The trial court granted the motion, concluding that all of the teacher's acts were either sexual or intentional, and entered judgment in favor of the insurance company. The appellate court affirmed, and our Supreme Court reversed. (Id. at p. 1081.) The Horace Mann court noted that it had previously decided that a liability insurer does not possess "a duty to indemnify an insured in an action for damages arising out of child molestation" in J. C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M. K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009 278 Cal. Rptr. 64, 804 P.2d 689. (Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) However, the court determined "the flaw in the insurance company's reasoning is its unsupported assumption that the other alleged misconduct necessarily was part of the molestation and not in the course of the teacher's educational activities." (Id. at p. 1082.) At the time of the summary adjudication proceeding, the teacher had admitted violating Penal Code section 288, thereby establishing at least one act of sexual misconduct that would be excluded from policy coverage. (Horace Mann, supra, at p. 1083.) However, the record was "devoid of evidence which establishes the chronology or sequence of events comprising the alleged misconduct or that these actions were integral to the molestation. For instance, the record is devoid of evidence demonstrating that the teacher's acts of other misconduct occurred in such close temporal and spatial proximity to the molestation as to compel the conclusion that they are inseparable from it for purposes of determining whether the insurance company had a duty to defend the teacher." (Id. at pp. 1083-1084.) The Horace Mann court underscored that this was so even if the admitted molestation was the "'dominant factor'" in the case. (Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1084.) Nonetheless, the court also reiterated that there may be cases where a plaintiff's allegations of molestation are "inseparably intertwined," eliminating the duty to defend. (Id. at p. 1085.)