In In re Andrew I. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 572, a minor, Scott, invited Andrew and a third minor to enter Scott's mother's home for the purpose of stealing her property. (Id. at p. 577.) Scott's mother testified that Scott had resided with her, but left the home one or two weeks prior to the burglary and had not returned. (Id. at p. 576.) While Andrew's felonious intent to steal was known to Scott and Scott helped him enter the home for that purpose, there is no indication that Scott's mother consented to Andrew entering her home for the purpose of committing a theft. (Ibid.) On appeal, Andrew challenged the burglary finding in his juvenile proceeding, contending that Scott had a possessory interest in the premises and invited Andrew to enter with knowledge of his felonious intent. (Id. at p. 578.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the burglary finding, first noting that Andrew lacked any possessory interest in or right to enter the premises. (Ibid.) The court then reasoned that Andrew could not invoke the consent defense because "Scott did not have an unconditional possessory interest in his mother's residence." (Id. at p. 579.) The court further reasoned that, separate from the fact Scott had left the home one or two weeks before the burglary, Scott did not "acquire a possessory interest simply because his mother had an obligation to support him. 'The parental obligation to provide for necessaries does not imply a possessory right in the parental residence. ... Financial support is all that is required by law. No possessory right in a parental residence is implied by this duty of financial support.'" (Ibid.) In In re Andrew I. (1991) the lower court at the disposition hearing noted the offense was a "residential burglary" and committed the minor to CYA. On appeal, the appellate court found that the terms "residential burglary" and "burglary of an inhabited dwelling" were the same for purposes of first degree burglary and were sufficient to determine the degree of the offense. (Id., at pp. 581-582.)