In re Caudillo

In In re Caudillo (1980) 26 Cal.3d 623, the California Supreme Court considered the meaning of the phrase "within 120 days of receipt of the prisoner." The question in Caudillo was whether the CRB (BPT's predecessor) had the power to hold a serious offender hearing and extend the term of defendant Caudillo who had been sentenced under the ISL and had won a reduction of his ISL sentence on appeal. Defendant Caudillo was convicted of multiple felonies in 1975 and sentenced to state prison for a term of 15 years to life under the ISL. After the DSL took effect on July 1, 1977, the CRB recomputed Caudillo's prison term pursuant to section 1170.2, subdivision (a). It was tentatively determined that defendant should serve three years base term for burglary enhanced by one year for use of a deadly weapon and three years for infliction of great bodily injury (based on a trial court finding), for a total DSL term of seven years. After reviewing Caudillo's file, two CRB members felt that he should serve an extended term pursuant to section 1170.2, subdivision (b). On April 6, 1978, a serious offender hearing was held at which Caudillo's base term for burglary was increased to four years and the three-year enhancement for great bodily injury was retained. Inadvertently, however, in setting the extended term the CRB failed to consider the abovementioned one-year enhancement for use of a deadly weapon. As a result Caudillo's CRB term was again set at seven years after his serious offender hearing. ( Id., at p. 627.) After the CRB became aware of its omission in setting Caudillo's extended term, it held another hearing on July 11, 1978, at which it decided that the seven-year term was "appropriate," and, since his ISL sentence translated to seven years under section 1170.2, subdivision (a), his term should be set under subdivision (a) and an extended term under subdivision (b) "was not then necessary." ( Id., at p. 628.) in September 1978, the Department of Corrections released Caudillo on parole after recomputing his sentence pursuant to the amended abstract of judgment issued by the superior court following receipt of the remittitur from the Supreme Court in People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, ordering the finding of great bodily harm stricken from the judgment. The amended abstract was received by the department on August 8, 1978. The department had administratively recomputed Caudillo's sentence to four years (three for burglary and one for use of a deadly weapon) and set his parole release date for September 22, 1978. When apprised of Caudillo's release, the CRB had him rearrested for the purpose of holding another serious offender hearing. On November 29, 1978, a new serious offender hearing was held and the CRB found him to be an appropriate subject for serious offender treatment and extended his term to seven years. Caudillo petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending, among other things, that the CRB acted in excess of its jurisdiction in subjecting him to a second serious offender hearing more than 120 days after he had been physically received in the prison. In affirming the action of the CRB, the high court characterized the issue raised by Caudillo in very broad terms: "The initial question in this case is whether the CRB has the authority to consider or reconsider the appropriateness of serious offender treatment when a sentence has been revised." ( Id., at p. 633.) The court also referred at length and repeatedly to the Legislature's purpose in enacting section 1170.2, subdivision (b). In its introduction, the court explained that "the Legislature recognized . . . that in some cases the conversion of ISL sentences into DSL equivalents would result in an inappropriate reduction of prison terms for dangerous prisoners. Consequently, in order to protect the public from the premature release of such dangerous persons, the Legislature established a 'serious offender' procedure as a safety valve, authorizing the CRB -- in cases in which the regular DSL term was inappropriate for an ISL prisoner -- to take into consideration the dangerousness of the offender in establishing a new term under the DSL." ( Id., at p. 626.) In its analysis of the DSL statute and its legislative history, the court stated that "the Legislature recognized that situations might arise in which mechanical recomputation from an ISL sentence to a DSL term . . . would result in the imposition of prison terms of inappropriate length. ( In re Flodihn, 25 Cal. 3d 561, 569-570 . . . .)" ( Id., at p. 631.) The court also noted that "the subdivision contains an explicit legislative declaration of a major factor to be taken into account by the CRB in setting a serious offender term, declaring that 'the necessity to protect the public from repetition of extraordinary crimes of violence against the person is the paramount consideration.'" ( Id., at p. 632; see also id., at p. 634; italics supplied.) Turning specifically to the extent of the CRB's jurisdiction to hold serious offender hearings and prescribe extended terms for defendants originally sentenced under the ISL, the Caudillo court observed initially that "in light of the legislative purpose underlying the serious offender procedure, we believe that the Legislature intended that the CRB have a reasonable opportunity to consider the appropriateness of serious offender treatment at a time when the CRB actually knows of the terms of the defendant's final judgment." ( Id., at p. 626; original italics.) The court also noted that "the CRB is endowed with significant discretion in fixing a prisoner's term under subdivision (b)." ( Id., at p. 632.) Finally, the court considered and rejected defendant Caudillo's argument that "120 days from receipt of the prisoner" must be interpreted to refer to the state prison's physical receipt of the prisoner, whether or not his or her sentence has been altered subsequent to that initial entry into prison. The court concluded that under defendant Caudillo's interpretation "the CRB would frequently lose jurisdiction to determine the appropriateness of serious offender treatment before the prisoner's ultimate ISL judgment was ever issued or received by the Department of Corrections. In light of the purpose of the serious offender provisions, we do not believe that the Legislature intended such a result. Since the serious offender procedure necessarily assumes that the CRB will have notice of the prisoner's actual judgment before the CRB makes the serious offender determination, we conclude that the statutory reference to 'receipt of the prisoner' must be interpreted to designate the receipt of the prisoner under an original or a modified ISL judgment." ( Id., at p. 635.) In Caudillo, the California Supreme Court answered the question "whether the CRB has the authority to consider or reconsider the appropriateness of serious offender treatment when a sentence has been revised "in the affirmative, stating: "In light of the statutory purpose of the serious offender provisions, we think that the CRB has such power. Alteration of an ISL sentence changes the corresponding DSL term. The CRB's view of the adequacy of the new DSL equivalent may very well differ from its initial assessment. In providing for serious offender treatment the Legislature sought to make sure that, in converting California's sentencing procedure from the ISL to the DSL, the public would be protected from the premature release of potentially dangerous and violent ISL offenders. It necessarily follows that the CRB should be able to consider serious offender treatment in light of an altered sentence." ( In re Caudillo, supra, 26 Cal.3d 623, 633.)