In In re Dana J. (1972) 26 Cal. App. 3d 768, a petition alleged a minor came within Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because he possessed narcotics. At trial, a referee acquitted the defendant of that charge but, noting the defendant needed probation, and over defendant's objection, amended the petition to add a charge of loitering and convicted him of that charge. (Dana J., supra, 26 Cal. App. 3d at p. 769.) The conviction raised the issue of whether the defendant had been denied a reasonable opportunity to defend against the loitering charge. (Id. at p. 771.) Without adjudging or declaring the defendant to be a ward of the court, the court placed the defendant on probation for six months. (Id. at p. 770.) The defendant filed an appeal but, during its pendency, and after the expiration of the six-month probationary period, a superior court judge ordered the case dismissed. (Dana J., supra, 26 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 769-770.) As a result, the People moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. (Id. at p. 771.) The appellate court in Dana J. wrote, "We do not believe that the appeal should be dismissed. In the case before us, appellant was found to have violated a law and was ordered to serve six months on probation. . . . It is, . . . 'the purpose of juvenile court law to secure for each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court such care and guidance . . . as will serve the . . . welfare of the minor and the best interests of the State; . . . This law shall be liberally construed to carry out these purposes.' 'The rights of the minor remain paramount in view of the serious consequences attending delinquency proceedings.' The juvenile's right of appeal, . . . affords the juvenile the opportunity to rid himself of 'the stigma of criminality' (T.N.G. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 767, 775 94 Cal. Rptr. 813, 484 P.2d 981) and to 'clear his name' of a criminal charge . To deny the juvenile this opportunity would serve neither the interests of the juvenile nor the interests of the state, and the fact that the juvenile suffered a noncustodial disposition (probation) rather than a custodial disposition (wardship), is of no more moment to the consideration of a juvenile appeal than it is to the consideration of an adult appeal. 'The matter of a besmirched name remains' , and the appeal is not moot. (See In re Richard D., 23 Cal. App. 3d 592, 594-595 100 Cal. Rptr. 351)" (Id. 4 Cal.3d at p. 771, )