In In re Eugene R. (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 605, the trial court set the minor's MTPC to the California Youth Authority (currently known as the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ)) at three years 10 months, consisting of a two-year base term for an auto theft offense, a one-year term for a felony assault with a deadly weapon offense, a four-month term for a misdemeanor tampering with a vehicle offense, and three two-month terms for three misdemeanor theft offenses. After the order issued, the court on its own motion gave notice to the probation officer that it intended to hold a hearing to review the minor's "'maximum commitment and days in custody.'" (Id. at p. 611.) In holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to modify the judgment, the Eugene R. court cited cases holding that in adult criminal cases, "where a defendant has commenced serving the sentence, the court has no jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence as pronounced and formally entered in the minutes in an attempt to revise its deliberately exercised judicial discretion unless the sentence was improper on its face" (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 612). The court then expressed its reasoning for applying this rule to juvenile delinquency proceedings: "The foregoing procedural rule should also apply to juvenile matters. Although denominated as civil in nature, the courts have long recognized and emphasized that original section 602 and supplementary juvenile proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. Ramifications of a section 602 hearing include a possible finding that the alleged criminal conduct is true, resulting in a substantial loss of personal freedom. . Former rule 39 of the California Rules of Court expressly provides for the application of the general rules relating to criminal appeals to all juvenile appeals.4 The Judicial Council in its advisory committee comment accompanying former rule 39 explains that such application 'would better enable the appellate courts to implement the legislative policy that juvenile court matters be handled expeditiously at the appellate as well as at the trial court level .' "When we apply the jurisdictional rule in controversy to juvenile proceedings, the cited legislative policy is promoted and the criminal appellate rules are followed. To conclude otherwise and allow collateral modification based upon another judge's view of abuse of discretion would inevitably promote 'judge-shopping' and sanction delay." (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at pp. 612--613, fn. 3.) The Eugene R. court rejected the Attorney General's argument that the juvenile court could modify the judgment pursuant to section 775 at any time that the court had continuing jurisdiction over the minor, stating: "Granted the juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction over the minor; however, such jurisdiction must be properly activated by petition or application and cannot be exercised on the court's own motion without procedural statutory authority." (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 613.) The court then cited the language of section 775 and stated: "Article 20, sections 775 through 779 read together, does not authorize the juvenile court to modify a previous order on its own motion. If such power was inherent or provided for by section 775, then the Judicial Council and the Supreme Court would not have enacted rule 1391(d) ... in the narrow manner written providing for the correction of only clerical errors in judgments, orders and the record by the court at any time on its own motion." (Eugene R., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d 605, 613.)