In In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, after the mother filed a section 388 petition, the court, using a Form JV-183 order, checked the box indicating "that a hearing was ordered to consider the petition 'because the best interest of the child may be promoted by it.'" (Id. at p. 1154.) At the hearing, the mother's counsel stated "her understanding that 'we are on for a setting of the . . . section 388 petition,'" and the agency's counsel argued that the mother was not entitled to a hearing because she had not satisfied either the changed circumstances or the best interests prongs. (Ibid.) The juvenile court indicated it had liberally construed the petition to afford the parties a chance to argue whether there should be an evidentiary hearing, and then denied the setting of such a hearing. (Ibid.) The appellate court held this was not an abuse of discretion. (In re G. B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1158-1159.) There, the court, looking at the overall context (as we do here), rejected the contention that the court had set an evidentiary hearing because of its use of the Form JV-183 order: "A contextual review of the record here shows that in checking the box on the form order indicating such a best interests finding, the juvenile court was not deciding that a prima facie case had been made but was instead scheduling the matter for the parties to argue the issue--an option not included on the form. When the court heard the parties' oral argument on whether an evidentiary hearing was required, it expressly clarified that it had liberally construed mother's petition 'in order to have an opportunity for the parties to argue for a hearing.' " (Id. at p. 1158.) The court concluded: "The parties here did not come to court expecting an evidentiary hearing; mother's counsel anticipated only that such a hearing would be set, and she understood that the Agency objected. " (Id. at p. 1159.)