In In re Jensen (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 262, the court held that a prior juvenile adjudication of voluntary manslaughter did not constitute a strike. First, the court reasoned that the prior juvenile adjudication for voluntary manslaughter was not an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b). Second, the court rejected the People's request that the court go beyond the bare adjudication to determine from the entire record whether the defendant's conduct, in addition to constituting voluntary manslaughter, amounted to an "assault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury." (Welf. & Inst. Code, 707, subd. (b).) Jensen reasoned that the court could examine the entire record to see if section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(B) was satisfied but that the court could not do so when applying section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(D). Jensen explained that no true finding was made as to assault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. "In other words, the defendant was not 'adjudged a ward of the juvenile court within the meaning of Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because' he committed an assault by any means likely to produce great bodily injury. ( 667, subd. (d)(3)(D).) Paragraph (D) requires an adjudication of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) offense; a showing the conduct includes the elements of such an offense is not adequate. Because the requirement of paragraph (D) was not satisfied, the defendant's prior adjudication does not qualify as a strike. The Three Strikes statute is clear: A prior juvenile adjudication cannot be used as a strike unless four conditions are met. ( 667, subd. (d)(3)(A)-(D).) These conditions include the requirement that the defendant, in the prior juvenile proceeding, was adjudged a ward because he or she committed at least one offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b). ( 667, subd. (d)(3)(D).) Furthermore, People v. Garcia, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1, teaches that the section of the Three Strikes law delineating what prior juvenile adjudications qualify as strikes ( 667, subd. (d)(3)) should be read narrowly according to its terms." ( Jensen, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 266.) Jensen also reasoned "In urging the record of the prior adjudication be examined to satisfy paragraph (D) by showing the defendant's conduct constituted a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) offense, the People effectively treat paragraph (D) as though it merely sets forth the offenses that qualify as juvenile strikes, much like paragraph (B). In doing so, the People lose sight of the salient requirement of paragraph (D) -- namely, the adjudication of wardship be based on at least one Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) offense. Such treatment also ignores the statutory interpretation adopted by our state's high court, which found paragraph (D) sets forth a necessary and independent requirement for using a prior juvenile adjudication as a strike. ( People v. Garcia, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 6, 12.) As the Supreme Court put it: 'We interpret paragraph (B) as setting out the list of prior juvenile offenses that will qualify as strikes and paragraph (D) as requiring, in addition, that in the prior juvenile proceeding giving rise to the qualifying adjudication the juvenile had been adjudged a ward of the court because of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) offense, whether or not that offense is the same as the offense currently alleged as a strike.' ( Id. at p. 6, ) In other words, 'paragraph (D), . . . unlike paragraph . . . (B), does not set forth a circumstance relating to "the prior offense." Instead, it requires that the juvenile "was adjudged" a ward under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) offense. ( 667, subd. (d)(3)(D).)' ( Id. at p. 7.)" ( Jensen, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 267.)