In In re Joshua S. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 670, the section 602 petition alleged that Joshua S. possessed cocaine base for sale and falsely represented his identity to a peace officer. He was determined to be eligible for DEJ. Thereafter, the possession count was amended to allege that Joshua S. was an accessory to a felony. He admitted the amended count and the second count was dismissed. Another wardship petition was filed, alleging four felony counts--possession of marijuana for sale, two counts of transportation or sale of marijuana, and unlawful carrying of a loaded firearm. Joshua S. was again determined to be eligible for DEJ. He filed a motion to suppress evidence, which apparently was not heard. He then admitted to an amended count of possession of cannabis and the remaining counts were dismissed. The juvenile court committed Joshua S. to a juvenile rehabilitation facility without considering DEJ. (Id. at pp. 674-675.) On appeal, Joshua S. argued that the matter must be remanded because the juvenile court failed to exercise its mandatory discretion to grant or deny DEJ. (Joshua S., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 675.) The court reviewed the DEJ procedures outlined above and observed: "'While the court retains discretion to deny DEJ to an eligible minor, the duty of the prosecuting attorney to assess the eligibility of the minor for DEJ and furnish notice with the petition is mandatory, as is the duty of the juvenile court to either summarily grant DEJ or examine the record, conduct a hearing, and make "the final determination regarding education, treatment, and rehabilitation . . . ." . . . . .' ." (Id. at pp. 677-678.) Joshua S. contended that the prosecutor's burdens had been met, but that the juvenile court failed to make the DEJ determination required by sections 790 and 791. (Joshua S., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 678.) The court rejected the People's argument that the court properly did not consider DEJ because Joshua S. had not admitted all of the allegations of the petitions, but rather, had negotiated a plea to reduced charges. (Id. at pp. 678-679.) The court reasoned: "Joshua S. did not initially admit the allegations of the petition, but neither did he insist on a jurisdictional hearing. . . . . . . A minor is not required to forego the right to a suppression hearing in order to accept DEJ. No part of a jurisdictional hearing was undertaken in the present case. When the suppression motion was denied . . . , Joshua S. admitted a reduced charge. In the other case, Joshua S. apparently did not pursue the suppression motion but rather admitted an amended petition. . . . Joshua S. did not reject DEJ and then seek to take advantage of it after contesting the allegations against him. We are not persuaded by the People's assertion that the DEJ procedures require the minor to admit the charge initially alleged in the petition rather than a reduced one, as long as the admission precedes a contested jurisdictional hearing. A minor is not entitled to DEJ where he or she does not '"admit the allegations" of the section 602 petition . . . "'in lieu of jurisdictional and dispositional hearings.'"' . . . . Here, however, no jurisdictional hearing was held." (Id. at pp. 679-680.) The Joshua S. court also rejected the People's contention that Joshua S. should not be considered for DEJ after negotiating a plea agreement reducing his legal responsibility because to do so "would remove a minor's incentive to 'expedite the process by a full admission of responsibility.'" (Joshua S., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 681.) The court explained: "The process in the present case was expedited: Joshua S. admitted the allegations of the (amended) petition right after the denial of his suppression motion . . . , with no attempt to litigate the petitions. Thus, DEJ could have been granted, if found appropriate, 'in lieu of jurisdictional and disposition hearings' ( 791, subd. (a)(3)). And Joshua S. did admit responsibility for his offenses, albeit not full responsibility for the initially charged offenses. In requiring a minor to 'admit each allegation contained in the petition,' section 791, subdivision (a)(3), does not specify that the petition cannot be amended where, as here, the amendment does not follow and is not the consequence of the minor contesting one or more of the allegations of the initial petition. . The circumstances of this case are consistent with the goal of expediting juvenile wardship proceedings and avoiding contested jurisdictional hearings. Further, making DEJ unavailable to a minor who admits an amended petition without contesting the allegations of the initial petition would not serve the stated statutory goal of increasing rehabilitation for first-time nonviolent offenders . . . . ." (Joshua S., at p. 681.) Accordingly, the matter was remanded so that the juvenile court could determine whether to grant or deny DEJ. (Id. at pp. 673, 682.)