In In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, over 6,000 people attended a Fourth of July celebration in a public park. A local congressman was invited to speak during the formal program that preceded the fireworks display. During the congressman's speech, a group of 25 to 250 persons rhythmically clapped and shouted for 5 to 10 minutes, demonstrating disapproval of the congressman's position on a grape boycott. The congressman, who had been using a microphone, was able to finish his speech, pausing to assure the demonstrators that they had a right to protest and encouraging them to be grateful that they lived in a country that protected that right. Neither the congressman nor the police asked the protestors to stop or disperse. When the speech and the program ended, the fireworks were shown. The demonstration did not affect the program. Charges were filed against the protestors two weeks later. ( Id. at pp. 935-936.) The Kay court noted that, with a single, irrelevant exception, Penal Code section 403 had not been interpreted since its passage almost a century earlier. It then considered the constitutionally permissible bounds of such a statute. The court pointed out that it was guided by principles affecting First Amendment rights and that the conduct involved in Kay, including the clapping, constituted "speech" for the purposes of its analysis. ( Kay, supra, 1 Cal. 3d at p. 938.) Justice Tobriner, writing for the majority, observed: "The Constitution does not require that any person, however lofty his motives, be permitted to obstruct the convention or continuation of a meeting without regard to the implicit customs and usage or explicit rules governing its conduct." ( Kay, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 938.) The rights of some to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances would be undermined if others could prevent or disrupt such activities by disregarding the customs and rules which apply to meetings at which those rights are exercised. On the other hand, other First Amendment rights are at stake when views are publicly expressed. The Kay court sought to strike the constitutionally required balance. "Audience activities, such as heckling, interrupting, harsh questioning, and booing, even though they may be impolite and discourteous, can nonetheless advance the goals of the First Amendment. For many citizens such participation in public meetings, whether supportive or critical of the speaker, may constitute the only manner in which they can express their views to a large number of people; the Constitution does not require that the effective expression of ideas be restricted to rigid and predetermined patterns." ( Kay, supra, 1 Cal. 3d at p. 939.) However, "the Constitution indubitably affords some measure of protection to the free expression of all those present at a meeting," including speakers, officials and the audience. ( Kay, supra, 1 Cal. 3d at p. 941, ) Because of this broad-ranging protection, "section 403's prohibition of 'disturbances' potentially may collide with safeguarded First Amendment interests. Nonetheless, the state retains a legitimate concern in ensuring that some individuals' unruly assertion of their rights of free expression does not imperil other citizens' rights of free association and discussion. Freedom of everyone to talk at once can destroy the right of anyone effectively to talk at all. Free expression can expire as tragically in the tumult of license as in the silence of censorship." (Ibid.) The Kay majority concluded that Penal Code section 403, as written, was constitutionally infirm because it applied to "every person who . . . willfully disturbs or breaks up any assembly or meeting . . . ." If invoked without restriction, the statute could criminalize conduct that was "nothing more than an expression of free speech protected by the Constitution." ( Kay, supra, 1 Cal. 3d at p. 941.) The court then interpreted section 403 in a way to serve its purpose without constitutional impingement: "Accordingly, we now explicitly recognize that, in light of the purposes of the provision and the competing First Amendment interests at stake, section 403 authorizes the imposition of criminal sanctions only when the defendant's activity itself--and not the content of the activity's expression--substantially impairs the effective conduct of a meeting.To effectuate section 403 within constitutional limits we interpret it to require the following showing to establish its transgression: that the defendant substantially impaired the conduct of the meeting by intentionally committing acts in violation of implicit customs or usages or of explicit rules for governance of the meeting, of which he knew, or as a reasonable man should have known." (Kay, at pp. 942-943.) The Kay court made clear that, in applying its ruling, the nature of the meeting in question "plays a major role." "The customs and usages at political conventions may countenance prolonged, raucous, boisterous demonstrations as an accepted element of the meeting process; similar behavior would violate the customs and usages of a church service. Audience participation may be enthusiastically welcomed at a bonfire football rally or an athletic contest, but considered taboo at a solemn ceremony of a fraternal order. . . . Thus, rather than enacting monolithic standards, section 403 draws its content from the implicit customs and usages or explicit rules germane to a given meeting." ( Kay, supra, 1 Cal. 3d at p. 943.) Kay involved the criminal prosecution of defendants who expressed views contrary to those voiced by an elected official at a large outdoor event.