In In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, the Court held that pension rights (vested or nonvested) are a property interest and to the extent that such rights derive from employment during coverture, they comprise a community asset subject to division in a dissolution proceeding. In so holding, the court carefully defined the correct terminology relating to the vested or nonvested status of pension rights. It said in this respect ( id., at p. 842): "Before we turn to the facts of this appeal we must devote a few words to terminology. Some decisions that discuss pension rights, but do not involve division of marital property, describe a pension right as 'vested' if the employer cannot unilaterally repudiate that right without terminating the employment relationship. (See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28; Kern v. City of Long Beach (1947) 29 Cal.2d 848, 855; Dryden v. Board of Pension Commrs. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 575, 579.) As we explain later, we believe that these decisions correctly define the point at which a pension right becomes a property interest. In divorce and dissolution cases following French v. French, however, the term 'vested' has acquired a special meaning; it refers to a pension right which is not subject to a condition of forfeiture if the employment relationship terminates before retirement. We shall use the term 'vested' in this latter sense as defining a pension right which survives the discharge or voluntary termination of the employee. "As so defined, a vested pension right must be distinguished from a 'matured' or unconditional right to immediate payment. Depending upon the provisions of the retirement program, an employee's right may vest after a term of service even though it does not mature until he reaches retirement age and elects to retire. Such vested but immature rights are frequently subject to the condition, among others, that the employee survive until retirement." The Brown court then proceeded to discuss the extent to which the new rule would be given retroactive application in respect of existing decrees dividing marital property, as follows (15 Cal.3d at pp. 850-851): "Robert finally contends that any decision overruling French v. French, supra, 17 Cal.2d 775 should be given purely prospective effect.