In In re Marriage of Ward (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1452, the parties divorced in California, and mother was awarded child support of $ 150 per month. Five years later, the district attorney of Kern County filed a petition on behalf of the county and mother under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA, former Code Civ. Proc., 1650-1699) in the Kern County Superior Court to enforce the support order against father, who then lived in Colorado. Several months later, a Colorado district court entered a "stipulated order" in a proceeding in which mother was not present but "represented by the county attorney" and father was present and represented by counsel. ( In re Marriage of Ward, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p 1455.) The order provided that father would pay $ 75 per month child support and $ 25 per month toward arrearages of $ 5,850. The order made no reference to the California support order. Father thereafter complied with the requirements of the Colorado order. However, approximately eight years later, after the child had reached majority, mother petitioned the California court to collect the arrearages which had accrued under the initial California order. Father answered the petition, but asserted that the Colorado order had modified and superceded the earlier California order, rendering it unenforceable. The trial court agreed with father, but the appellate court reversed. As the Ward court explained, under URESA, a reciprocal support order issued by a sister state "will not act to modify the prior support order unless the reciprocal order reflects that the issue of modification was raised and litigated. . . .The record in the instant case does not indicate that the Colorado court specifically intended to modify the California order. There is no indication that a separate action was ever filed to modify the California order. It is clear in the instant case that there was no request for modification, and the order of the Colorado court did not mention modification but merely ordered respondent to pay the amount he was apparently able to pay at the time." ( In re Marriage of Ward, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at 1456-1457.) The court also noted that the entry of a different order in Colorado could not have amounted to a waiver by mother of the original California order. In fact, although mother was "represented" in Colorado by the county attorney, she was not technically a party to that Colorado action. "As noted in Jager v. County of Alameda (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 294, '"the statutory scheme empowers the district attorney to establish, modify and enforce support obligations 'in the name of the county on behalf of the child, children or caretaker parent.; . . . The purpose of such actions is to provide a direct procedure for a county to recoup public assistance, and to assist parents with limited resources to enforce support obligations so that public funds are not again unnecessarily expended. Notwithstanding the collateral benefit to the custodial parent, the 'client' in such actions remains the county'" " ( Id. at p. 297, ) There is no attorney-client relationship created between the district attorney and the parent in such support actions." ( In re Marriage of Ward, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at 1457-1458.)