In In re Ronald V. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1803, the mother agreed to the termination of her parental rights on the understanding that the prospective adoptive father would permit the mother to continue her relationship with the child. After the adoptive father died, the mother filed a petition for modification of the order terminating her parental rights. ( Id. at p. 1805.) The juvenile court denied the petition. (Ibid.) The court in In re Ronald V., supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at page 1806, held that former section 366.26, subdivision (h), now section 366.26, subdivision (i), precludes modification of an order terminating parental rights. The court stated as follows: "Having failed to appeal from the termination order, the mother's petition to modify the permanency planning order was in substance a collateral attack on the termination of her parental rights. She was asking the court to give her de facto parent status and visitation rights, in addition to changing the plan for the minor from adoption to long-term foster care or guardianship. She was, in short, asking the juvenile court to do what it no longer had the jurisdiction to do--namely to undo the termination of her parental rights and reinstate her now as a de facto parent to the minor. Former subdivision (h) of section 366.26 specifically states that once the termination order issues the court has 'no power' to 'modify it.' The lower court had no jurisdiction to hear the section 388 motion, because in this instance the motion was nothing more than a collateral attack, made after the time to appeal had elapsed, on the order terminating parental rights." ( In re Ronald V., supra, at p. 1806.) In its disposition of the appeal, the court in In re Ronald V. held that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition, and declared the order denying the petition void. ( In re Ronald V., supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1807.) However, the court also held that the order was appealable. Accordingly, the appeal was not dismissed. ( Id. at p. 1807, fn. 2.)