Ingrid E. v. Superior Court

In Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, a Third Appellate District panel discussed the due process considerations that must frame any discussion of the right to contested hearings in dependency proceedings: "It is axiomatic that due process guarantees apply to dependency proceedings. Parties to such proceedings have a due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, at least at the jurisdictional phase. The essence of due process is fairness in the procedure employed; a meaningful hearing, one including the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, is an essential aspect of that procedure. But due process also is a flexible concept, whose application depends on the circumstances and the balancing of various factors. " ( Ingrid E., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 756-757.) Ingrid E. involved a parent's request for a contested hearing on the issue of whether she had proven herself capable of taking care of her minor children. ( Ingrid E., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 753, 759.) The social services agency had recommended termination of further reunification services, based on a psychological evaluation showing little improvement in her parenting capabilities after 18 months of services. ( Id. at p. 753.) The juvenile court refused to set a contested hearing on mother's objections to the evaluation and recommendation because mother was unable to make an offer of proof that her therapist thought it was appropriate for the children to be returned to her. ( Id. at pp. 754-755.) The juvenile court terminated further services to the mother, and scheduled a hearing on termination of her parental rights. ( Id. at p. 755.) The Court of Appeal reversed. It found the mother had a right to a contested hearing even if she had no evidence of her own to offer and wished only to cross-examine those witnesses whose evaluations formed the basis for the agency's recommendation. ( Ingrid E., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 759.) The court noted it was the agency's burden to establish that returning the minors to parental custody would be detrimental. (Ibid.) The court also rejected the agency's claim that any error was harmless because the juvenile court would have reached a result adverse to the mother even if it had conducted an evidentiary hearing: "Petitioner averred that many circumstances had changed in her favor. She wanted to show that both the psychologist and social worker had relied on stale information. On this record, we refuse to speculate that such examination by petitioner at a contested hearing would be doomed to failure." ( Id. at p. 760.)