In Isbell v. County of Sonoma (1978) 21 Cal.3d 61, the court found unconstitutional California's then existing confession of judgment law (former 1132-1134). In that case persons who received excessive welfare payments executed confessions of judgment in favor of the county. Those persons sought declaratory relief, arguing that California's confession of judgment law was unconstitutional. (Id. at pp. 64-66.) The court noted that then existing "Code of Civil procedure section 1132, subdivision (a), provides generally that 'A judgment by confession may be entered without action either for money due or to become due, or to secure any person against contingent liability on behalf of the defendant, or both, in the manner prescribed by this chapter. Such judgment may be entered in any court having jurisdiction for like amounts.' Section 1133 specifies that the confession must be in writing, verified by the defendant, and must state concisely the facts constituting the liability. The creditor files the judgment with the court clerk, 'who must endorse upon it, and enter a judgment of such court for the amount confessed' ." (Isbell v. County of Sonoma, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 67.) Section 1133 states: "A statement in writing must be made, signed by the defendant, and verified by his oath, to the following effect: "1. It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum; "2. If it be for money due, or to become due, it must state concisely the facts out of which it arose, and show that the sum confessed therefor is justly due, or to become due; "3. If it be for the purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the facts constituting the liability, and show that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same." The court observed that under the due process clause of the federal Constitution, judgment may be entered against a defendant only if the defendant received notice and an opportunity to be heard or the defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. Since the confession of judgment procedure authorizes entry of judgment without prior notice and hearing, its constitutionality turns on whether the defendant has made an adequate waiver of those rights. The court noted that the waiver of constitutional rights is not presumed. (Isbell v. County of Sonoma, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 68.) The court first considered whether the debtor's assent to the confession of judgment itself demonstrated a voluntary waiver of constitutional rights. The court noted that confession of judgment clauses most often appeared in form contracts dictated by the party with a bargaining advantage. The court concluded that assent to a contract of adhesion could not operate as a valid waiver of rights. It went on, however, to state that even when the confession of judgment was not dictated by the creditor, the drastic nature of the device "strongly suggests a substantial disparity in bargaining position and implies overreaching on the part of the creditor. Thus except in the rare case in which the confession of judgment itself shows that it was a negotiated agreement between equal bargainers, . . . a court presented only with the verified confession of judgment cannot assume the voluntariness of any waiver of due process rights implicit in that confession." (Isbell v. County of Sonoma, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 70.) The court next considered whether the debtor's execution of a confession of judgment established a knowing and intelligent waiver. It concluded that it did not. The court stated: "Sad experience has shown that the confession of judgment procedure lends itself to overreaching, deception, and abuse. Such a confession cannot on its face represent a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver." (Isbell v. County of Sonoma, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 71.) The court rejected a case-by-case determination of whether a particular confession of judgment was made after a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. It noted California's confession of judgment law did not provide for a prejudgment determination of that issue. When the confession of judgment is presented to the clerk of the court, judgment is entered. (Isbell v. County of Sonoma, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 71.) The court concluded that the opportunity to attack a confessed judgment by a postjudgment motion was not an adequate remedy since it did not allow determination of the validity of the waiver of constitutional rights at a meaningful time, i.e., before the entry of judgment. (Isbell v. County of Sonoma, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 71-72.)