In Jankey v. Lee (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1038, the Supreme Court considered the relationship of the "broadly worded two-way fee-shifting clause" in actions under Civil Code section 55, part of the DPA, and the narrower provision in the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; ADA), which, as held in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, supra, 434 U.S. 412, "allows defendants fees only for responding to frivolous claims and makes fee recovery discretionary." (Jankey, at pp. 1045, 1047.) The court held the ADA does not preempt Civil Code section 55 insofar as the state law affords prevailing defendants a broader entitlement to recovery of attorney fees than would federal law. (Jankey, at pp. 1049-1056.) After discussing general preemption principles, the doctrine of conflict preemption and quoting language from section 501, subdivision (b) (42 U.S.C. 12201(b)), of the ADA that disavows any broad preemptive intent, permitting states to enact and enforce complementary laws protecting the rights of individuals with disabilities, the court concluded, absent congressional intervention, "California has every right to adopt whatever fee regime it deems appropriate upon invocation of state law remedies. It may establish both the costs of and the potential payoffs for seeking a state remedy while leaving undisturbed the corresponding costs and payoffs that flow from invocation of a comparable federal remedy." (Jankey, at p. 1054.) Civil Code section 55's fee-shifting provision does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's purpose in limiting fees under the ADA to the prevailing defendant, the court reasoned, because "it is only the invocation of the state law remedy, and not the ADA, that triggers the award of fees in cases of overlap; it is only the state law remedy, and not the ADA, that stands to be chilled by the broader availability of defense fees. Plaintiffs can always sue under the ADA alone ... ." (Jankey, at p. 1055.) The Jankey court, however, addressed only the doctrine of federal preemption and concluded no congressional policy precluded a mandatory award of attorney fees under state law when those fees overlapped with fees incurred in defending a claim under the ADA. The Supreme Court's opinion did include a single paragraph explaining nothing in the text or legislative history of Civil Code section 55 indicated a fee recovery under that provision should be limited as a matter of state law based on the overlap with federal remedies. (Jankey v. Lee, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1056.) Because the issue had not been properly presented in the trial court or Court of Appeal, the court declined to consider the markedly different question whether any state legislative objectives would be impaired by an award of fees for work on overlapping state law claims when the California Legislature had expressly limited or precluded defense fees for some of those claims. (Jankey v. Lee, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1056, fn. 16.)