In Jellinek v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal. App. 3d 652, the appellate court concluded that a case may not be transferred from small claims court to superior court, on the plaintiff's motion, after the running of the statute of limitations, for the purpose of allowing the plaintiff to increase her prayer for damages. Jellinek furnished two reasons for this conclusion: there was no "specific statutory provision for such a procedure," and the procedure was inherently inconsistent with the informal nature and simplicity of the small claims process. Jellinek added: "Because the small claims court is . . . separately defined, with its own rules, procedures, and enabling legislation, and indeed because the judicial precedent has taken pains to maintain that separateness and consequent informality of the small claims court, that court cannot be considered as simply another division of the municipal court, invested with the same general powers as appertain to that body." It is true this observation was made when California still had municipal courts, rather than one unified superior court in each county. Nevertheless, the observation applies equally to the superior court/small claims division context, and the Legislature, in unified court legislation, has recognized as much.