In Marcus v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 598, the WCAB had referred the hearing on the contempt charge to a referee (who is now called a "workers' compensation judge"). The referee presided only at the hearing; the finding of contempt was made by the WCAB after reviewing the transcripts and the documentary evidence. The court in Marcus held that this procedure was invalid. The court first noted that "the power to punish for contempt is a judicial power of the highest degree that the Legislature has, pursuant to the provisions of Labor Code section 134, vested exclusively in the 'appeals board or any member thereof,' and is a power which may not be delegated by the appeals board to a referee." ( Id., at p. 604.) The court annulled the finding of contempt on the basis that the hearing must be held before the WCAB or a member thereof, stating: "Assuming, however, that Labor Code section 134 confers upon the 'appeals board or any member thereof' the power to punish for contempt 'in like manner and to the same extent as courts of record,' sections 1217 and 1218 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply. In the case of an indirect contempt, section 1217 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that '. . . the court or judge must proceed to investigate the charge, and must hear any answer which the person arrested may make to the same, and may examine witnesses for or against him . . .'. The board's procedure in assigning a referee to hear the matter and thereafter adjudicating petitioner in contempt in absentia, on the basis of a transcript of the proceedings, was not in accordance with the statute or with due process. Petitioner is entitled to appear before and be heard by the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon him (see Arthur v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.2d 404, 408-409)." ( Marcus, supra, 35 Cal.App.3d at p. 605.)