In Maria D. v. Westec Residential Security, Inc. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 125, a Swedish citizen was driving along a highway at 2:00 a.m. when she was detained by a uniformed, armed employee of the defendant company driving a patrol car. She thought the man was a police officer. He shone a flashlight in her face, asked for her driver's license, performed a field sobriety test on her and informed that he could put her in jail or get her deported. He ordered her into his car, drove her to another location and raped her. (Id. at p. 130.) When the plaintiff sued the company for damages, the trial court summarily adjudicated that the company could not be held vicariously liable for the rape under the principles of Mary M. and other cases. (Id. at p. 129.) The trial court's judgment was affirmed on appeal. The appellate court's reasoning was that the sexual assault did not arise out of the security guard's duties. The company did not authorize their employees to make traffic stops, make drunk driving arrests, to shine spotlights on moving vehicles or carry unauthorized passengers in their company vehicles. (Id. at pp. 147-148.) It concluded that "the mere fact the security guard had an opportunity to abuse the trappings of his profession does not render Westec vicariously liable for the rape.. . . . The security guard's sexual assault of plaintiff was not fairly attributable to any peculiar aspect of Westec's business operations. It was the independent product of his aberrant decision to engage in conduct unrelated to his duties. " (Id. at pp. 146-147.)