In Martinez v. Board of Parole Hearings (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 578, the appellate court held the standard of review of the Board's determination under section 1170, subdivision (e)(2)(B), regarding a prisoner's dangerousness, "is the same as that used when reviewing a decision by the Board to deny parole, i.e., 'whether "some evidence" supports the conclusion' of the Board that the prisoner does not come within the statutory criteria." (Id. at p. 593; see also id. at p. 582.) "This standard of review is 'highly deferential' to the Board's factfinding. It does not permit a court to second-guess the Board's factfinding. Our role is narrow. A court has the authority to do no more than 'ensure that the Board's decision reflects "an individualized consideration of the specified criteria" and is not "arbitrary and capricious,"' , i.e., that the Board's decision is supported by '"some evidence"' viewed in the light most favorable to the decision ." (Id. at pp. 593-594.) The Court was asked to decide whether section 1170, subdivision (e), required the Board to recommend a sentence recall and compassionate release once it determined a prisoner met the criteria under subdivision (e)(2), or whether, as the Board argued in that case, the Board retained discretion to decline to recommend a sentence recall to an otherwise eligible prisoner. (Martinez v. Board of Parole Hearings, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 588-589.) After reviewing the legislative history, the court concluded the dual purposes behind section 1170, subdivision (e), were to provide compassion to dying prisoners and to save money by relieving state prisons of the obligation to provide expensive end-of-life medical care. (Id. at pp. 590-592.) In light of that legislative intent, the court concluded it was required to interpret section 1170, subdivision (e)(1) "in a way that effectuates the provision's primary purpose of saving the state money." (Martinez v. Board of Parole Hearings, at p. 592.) Therefore, the court rejected the Board's suggested interpretation because it would thwart the Legislature's intent. (Ibid.)