In Martinez v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 695, the appellate court recognized three tests for determining whether an intervening cause constitutes a superseding cause. The appellate court stated: "If any of these three tests is found by the trier of fact, intervening negligence will supersede." ( Id. at p. 701.) First, the general rule provides: "Intervening negligence cuts off liability, and becomes known as a superseding cause, if '"it is determined that the intervening cause was not foreseeable and that the results which it caused were not foreseeable . . . ."'" ( Id. at p. 700.) Under that general rule, "superseding cause will be found if both the intervening negligent act and the result are unforeseeable." ( Id. at p. 701.) However, "there are two other tests . . . which may support a finding of superseding cause even if the resulting harm is foreseeable." (Ibid.) The second test provides: "'The fact that an intervening act of a third person is done in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause if a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person is done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person so acted . . . .'" (Ibid.) The second test "is but another way of saying that foreseeable intervening ordinary negligence will not supersede but such negligence, if 'highly extraordinary,' will supersede." (Ibid.) Finally, the third test provides: "'The fact that an intervening act of a third person is done in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause if . . . the act is a normal response to a situation created by the defendant's conduct and the manner in which the intervening act is done is not extraordinarily negligent. '" (Ibid.) The third test is "but another way of saying a normal, but negligent, intervening response will not supersede but an extraordinarily negligent response will supersede." (Ibid.)