Mata v. City of Los Angeles

In Mata v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 141, the appellant, a discharged police officer, combined his petition for a writ of mandate challenging his termination with various causes of action under 42 United States Code section 1983. The trial court granted the writ of mandate and later granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the 1983 claims on the ground the appellant was collaterally estopped from pursuing those claims by his successful pursuit of the writ of mandate. ( Mata v. City of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 146.) Concluding that the appellant's 42 United States Code section 1983 claims were not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, Mata stated: "In this case the 'second suit,' i.e., the 42 United States Code section 1983 action, is on a different cause of action. In fact, the mandamus proceeding is technically not an action at all. It is, instead, described as a special proceeding. Therefore, appellant's 42 United States Code section 1983 action is not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. " ( Mata v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 149.) Mata seems to reason that because cases discussing the claim preclusion aspect of res judicata sometimes refer to the second suit as involving the same or a different "cause of action," only "actions," as opposed to "special proceedings" can have claim-preclusive effect. Code of Civil Procedure section 21 divides judicial remedies into two categories: actions and special proceedings. Code of Civil Procedure section 22 defines an "action" as "an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the declaration, enforcement, or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense." Code of Civil Procedure section 23 provides: "Every other remedy is a special proceeding."