In McCallion v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc. (1893) 98 Cal. 442, 445, the court concluded that money held by the court constituted personal property within the meaning of the predecessor statute to section 917.2. The court explained, "This money constituted a special fund in the hands of the court, and the litigation between these parties was conducted for the purpose of securing a judgment of the court, adjudicating as to where the title to this fund was located. When the money came into the possession of the court the litigation resolved itself essentially into an action to try the title to personal property, and if the judgment rendered in this case was such as to bring itself within the provisions of any of the sections of the code from 942 to 945 inclusive, it came within section 943 as a judgment directing the delivery of personal property. While it is intimated in Estate of Schedel (1886) 69 Cal. 241, 242 that the term "personal property," as used in section 943, does not include money, we have no doubt that where the money is a special fund and capable of identification, it would answer to the term 'personal property,' as used in that section." (McCallion, p. 445.) In 1968, when the Legislature recodified the statutory provisions for stays pending appeal, former sections 942-949a were replaced by present sections 916-923. (Stats. 1968, ch. 385, 1-2, pp. 816-820.) In particular, section 943, which provided for stay of judgments or orders directing assignment or delivery of documents or personal property was recodified in section 917.2. (Stats. 1897, ch. 64, 1, p. 56.) In McCallion v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc., supra, 98 Cal. at page 445, the court went on to hold that no bond was required for a stay because the fund was not in the possession of appellants, as required under the former code section.