In Medina v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1280, Division Five of this district endeavored "to clear up any confusion that may exist about the ruling in People v. Griffin (1991) on the part of prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys." ( Id. at p. 1288.) In Medina, after previously agreeing to a number of continuances beyond the 60-day period applicable to felony defendants under section 1382, the defendant requested a further continuance to January 11, 2000. The trial court explained that the defendant had a right to have his case tried within 10 days of January 11, but because his attorney was requesting the continuance to January 31, he would have the right to be tried "within ten days of that day." The defendant consented. ( Medina, supra, 79 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1283.) When the defendant answered ready for trial on January 11, the People asked "to trail this to the last day," indicating that they needed "the ten days." The trial court continued the trial "until the last day--the last day, February 10th," noting again, "That is our last day." On February 10, citing the Griffin case as authority, the People asked the court to trail the matter to the following Monday (Feb. 14), arguing that when the defendant agreed to continue trial to January 31 with the explanation that he would have the right to be tried within 10 days of that day, he was actually consenting to a continuance of his trial date to February 10 so the 10-day period set forth in section 1382 did not begin running until February 10, making the true last day for trial February 20. ( Medina, supra, 79 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 1283-1284.) The trial court read Griffin and interpreted it as the People suggested despite the belief that the result was "not logical, made no sense, and 'boggles the mind.' " ( Medina, supra, 79 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1284.) Emphasizing that "the holding in Griffin is limited to a situation where a defendant unilaterally agrees to a nonstatutory trailing period," Division Five rejected the People's construction of Griffin as "illogical, contrary to the clear meaning of . . . section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(B), and contrary to public policy." ( Id. at pp. 1288-1289, ) The Medina court commented: "Griffin did not address the validity of a stipulated continuance where the People also waive their right to the 10-day grace period and agree that the last day for trial can be 15, 20 or 30 days (or whatever date the People and defendant agree on) after the new date to which the trial is continued. There does not appear to be any reason why the People and defendant cannot both waive their interests protected by the 10-day grace period and stipulate to a last day that is truly a last day for trial. In the instant case, however, the People did not expressly waive their right to a 10-day grace period, so we do not have to reach this issue." ( Medina, supra, 79 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1287, fn. 4.)