In Menjou v. Superior Court (1932) 128 Cal.App. 117, the defendant was charged with murder. The jury was instructed that under the evidence it could convict him of either murder or manslaughter or, if it concluded that he was guilty of neither offense, it could acquit him altogether. Three-verdict forms which reflected those instructions were provided. Rather than utilizing any of the prepared forms, the jury executed its own form which stated that it found the defendant "not guilty of murder, a felony, as charged . . . ." After the verdict had been brought in, the foreman expressed some "uncertainty" about it. He explained that although the jurors had unanimously agreed that the defendant was not guilty of murder, their last vote on the manslaughter charge had been eight for acquittal and four for conviction. The court then set the matter for retrial on the manslaughter charge and the jury was discharged. The defendant petitioned the appellate court for extraordinary relief, claiming that double jeopardy principles prohibited any retrial on the manslaughter charge. The court agreed, analyzing the problem in two stages. First, it noted that Penal Code section 1023 provided that an acquittal on an information barred any retrial for the charged offense "or for an offense necessarily included therein, of which he might have been convicted under that . . . information." Then, adverting to the long-standing rule that the return of a verdict of acquittal bars any retrial notwithstanding the fact that the verdict resulted from judicial or jury error (see People v. Webb (1869) 38 Cal. 467, 477-479), the court concluded that further prosecution for manslaughter was barred. ( Menjou v. Superior Court, supra, 128 Cal.App. at pp. 120-122.)