In Miller & Lux Inc. v. Superior Court (1923) 192 Cal. 333, the parties entered into a series of stipulations continuing the trials of three related actions, both in writing and by oral agreement in open court. (Id. at pp. 335-336.) The last written stipulation continued the trials to March 24, 1920. (Id. at p. 336.) The last oral agreement in open court continued the trials to September 28, 1920. (Id. at p. 337.) On October 19, 1920, the trial court on its own motion continued the trials to November 15, 1920. (Ibid.) On November 10, 1920, after expiration of the parties' last extension, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to former section 583. (Miller & Lux, at p. 337.) The trial court denied the motion and the defendants filed petitions for writs of mandate, which were granted. (Ibid.) In granting the petitions, the Miller & Lux court explained: "It is, of course, well settled that any stipulation of the defendants extending the statutory period did not operate as a waiver for all future time of the right of defendants to a dismissal after the expiration of the extended period. Neither did any of the written stipulations entered into within the five-year period continuing the trials from time to time within the statutory period have the effect of extending the time beyond the five-year period. A written stipulation, however, expressly waiving the benefit of the section, or postponing the case to a time beyond the statutory period, would have the effect of extending the statutory period to the date to which the trial was postponed. " (Miller & Lux, supra, 192 Cal. at pp. 337-338.) The Court held that plaintiffs' being present in court and ready to proceed to trial on the crucial date was not the equivalent of the case having been "'brought to trial' on that date." (192 Cal. at pp. 341-342.) In its discussion the court stated: "Not only was that plaintiffs' informing the court that expiration of the five-year period was imminent not done in the instant case, but it appears that the postponement of the trial of the cases from the date upon which they were set for trial . . . was had without objection from the plaintiffs. . . . Doubtless if objection had been made and the trial court's attention called to the fact that a further continuance would have the effect of putting the case beyond the bar of the statute, the trial court would have ordered that the cases proceed to trial or else have exacted a written stipulation from the defendants extending the time of trial. It may be suggested that if counsel had desired to avoid the bar of the statute it would have been a very simple matter, after calling the court's attention to the situation, to have requested that one witness be sworn in the cases and then the hearing of the cases continued until a time which would be convenient for the court and the parties to the action. " (192 Cal. at p. 342.)