In Morrison v. Land (1915) 169 Cal. 580, the complaint alleged as follows. The defendant owned a hotel in Sacramento for a period of about 40 years. Throughout that time, the plaintiff served as the hotel's chief clerk, accountant, and bookkeeper. He assisted the defendant in the management and operation of the hotel and acted as the assistant manager when the defendant was not present. Over the years, the plaintiff received offers of employment from other hotels willing to pay him higher compensation. To keep the plaintiff in his employ, the defendant agreed that--in the words of the complaint--" 'if he, said plaintiff, would remain with the defendant . . . and thereafter attend to, render and perform at defendant's said Western Hotel, such services as he, plaintiff, was then performing for' defendant, 'so long as defendant . . . owned and conducted said Western Hotel, that he, defendant, . . . would by his last will and testament devise and bequeath to plaintiff the sum of fifty thousand dollars.' " (Morrison, supra, 169 Cal. at p. 583.) In reliance on the defendant's promise, the plaintiff remained at the hotel until the defendant retired. (Ibid.) Upon the defendant's death, his will was admitted to probate. The will left nothing to the plaintiff, who filed a civil action against the executors, executrix, devises, and legatees, seeking quasi-specific performance of the defendant's agreement to leave him $ 50,000. The complaint did not allege that the plaintiff had submitted a claim for payment to the executors and executrix. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint and dismissed the action on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, explaining: "There is no dissent in the authorities from the proposition that one may make a valid contract with another to devise or bequeath property by his last will in a certain specified way. It is clear that in the event of a breach of such a contract the party damaged has an action at law for the damage caused by such breach of the promisor, and in some cases this, by reason of the circumstances, may be his only remedy, for a resort to any equitable remedy can be had only where the circumstances are such as to make the case one within the well-settled principles relative to the proper exercise of equitable jurisdiction. "Where the party damaged is restricted to his remedy at law for the breach, he must necessarily proceed upon the theory that he is a 'creditor' of the deceased, having a 'claim against the estate' 'arising upon contract,' within the meaning of those words as used in our probate law, and he is subject to the provisions of our statutes requiring presentation of claims to the executor or administrator and judge. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1490 et seq. now Prob. Code, 9000 et seq..) In the absence of such presentation, such a claim, by express provision of the statute, is forever barred. (See Prob. Code, 9002, subd. (b); Venturi v. Taylor (1995) 35 Cal. App. 4th 16 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272.) While, owing to the nature of the contract before us, a final breach cannot be regarded as occurring until the death of the deceased, the breach was committed by the deceased, and the liability on account thereof is his. . . . It is essential to an action for breach of contract to compensate one for services by making provision in such person's favor in a will, that a claim against the estate be presented, that no claim could exist against the estate in such case except one founded upon the fact that such services were performed and no provision made in the will for compensation, and that the particulars of the claim should be stated. It is well settled that where presentation of a claim against the estate is essential, a complaint which does not aver that the claim has been presented fails to state a cause of action." (Morrison, supra, 169 Cal. at pp. 584-585.) The court continued, emphasizing the distinction between equitable and legal remedies: "Courts of equity, to use the language of Pomeroy, 'will under special circumstances, enforce a contract to make a will, or to make a certain testamentary disposition, . . . not by ordering a will to be made, but by regarding the property in the hands of the heirs, devisees, assignees, or representatives of the deceased promisor, as impressed with a trust in favor of the plaintiff, and by compelling defendant, who must, of course, belong to some one of these classes of persons, to make such a disposition of the property as will carry out the intent of the agreement.' . . . "It is elementary that where, as here, the primary right of a party is legal in its nature, as distinguished from equitable, and one for which the law affords some remedy, as here damages by way of compensation for breach of contract, a proper exercise of the equitable jurisdiction will not give equitable relief in any case where the legal remedy is full and adequate and does complete justice. No principle of equitable jurisprudence is more firmly established than this. . . . For instance, the exclusive jurisdiction of equity to grant relief by way of specific performance of a contract will be exercised only in those cases where the legal remedy of compensatory damages is insufficient under the circumstances of the case, in the opinion of the court, to do complete justice between the parties." (Morrison, supra, 169 Cal. at p. 586, and omitted.) The court in Morrison recognized that the legal remedy of damages is generally inadequate in real property disputes: "Courts of equity have established the . . . rule that in general the legal remedy of damages is inadequate in all agreements for the sale or letting of land . . . ." (Morrison, supra, 169 Cal. at pp. 586-587.)