In Motor City Sales v. Superior Court (1973) 31 Cal. App. 3d 342, real party in interest Laurier Proulx filed a personal injury action in the Superior Court of Kern County against several named and fictitious defendants. As to the latter Proulx alleged: "Defendant DOES I through XXV, inclusive, are sued herein pursuant to the provisions of Section 474 of the California Code of Civil Procedure." (Id. at p. 344.) Proulx subsequently served petitioner Motor City Sales as Doe XIII. Motor City filed a timely notice of motion to quash the service of summons and a motion to dismiss (Code Civ. Proc., 418.10). The superior court denied the motions and Motor City filed a petition for writ of mandate with this court to compel the superior court to quash service of summons and to dismiss the action. Petitioner argued the superior court lacked jurisdiction because it was not properly designated as a fictitious defendant in the complaint. The Court denied the petition for writ and discharged the order to show cause, stating in relevant part: "The purpose of the fictitious name statute is to enable the plaintiff to commence an action before it has become barred by the statute of limitations due to plaintiff's ignorance of the identity of the defendant , and the statute should be liberally construed to accomplish that purpose .. . . "The requirement of good faith ignorance of the true name of a fictitiously designated defendant is directed at preventing an abuse of the statute, primarily by requiring those whose names and connection with the cause of action are known to be named and served in order that they may properly prepare their defenses. Once the plaintiff's actual good faith ignorance of the defendant's true name is established, that purpose is fully accomplished. Whether such ignorance is expressly and directly alleged in the complaint or indirectly alleged by reference to the statute (Code Civ. Proc., 474) would have no effect either upon the purpose of the statute or the rights of the defendant. In either case, the defendant can attack the legitimacy of his being named fictitiously by way of motion to quash, to strike, to set aside a default, or for summary judgment. In short, there is no prejudice to the defendant-the one who is most vitally affected; a contrary result would exalt form over substance and would operate to defeat the purpose of the statute. . . ." (Motor City Sales v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 345-346.)