In Noronha v. Stewart (1988) 199 Cal. App. 3d 485, Lawrence Jett granted the defendants an easement to build a wall. The defendants incorrectly believed the property was owned by Mr. Jett. In other words, when the wall was constructed, Mr. Jett did not own the property and hence had no authority to convey the easement. After the wall was constructed, Mr. Jett obtained legal title to the property bearing the burden of the encroachment. Mr. Jett then sold his property to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs demanded that the defendants take down the wall. ( Id. at pp. 487-489.) The Court of Appeal held Mr. Jett and his successors, the plaintiffs, were estopped to contest the easement. ( Id. at p. 490.) The court explained: "It has long been recognized . . . that if a grantor purports to convey an interest in land which the grantor does not own, but afterwards acquires, the interest passes to the grantee at the time the grantor obtains it. 'The general rule is that if the grantor in a conveyance of real property has no title, a defective title, or an estate less than that which he assumed to grant, but subsequently he acquires the title or estate he purported to convey or perfects his title, the after-acquired or perfected title will inure to the grantee or his successors by way of estoppel, i.e., the grantor is estopped to deny that the after-acquired title passed by his conveyance.' (1 Ogden's Revised Cal. Real Property Law (Cont.Ed.Bar 1974) 4.20, p. 142.) The effect 'is the same as if it were written upon the fact of the instrument that the grantor conveyed all the estate which he then possessed or which he might at any time thereafter acquire. ' ( Younger v. Moore (1909) 155 Cal. 767, 773, 103 P. 221 ; accord Warburton v. Kieferle (1955) 135 Cal. App. 2d 278, 284, 287 P.2d 1 .) This doctrine of 'after-acquired title' is recognized in California and has been partially codified into Civil Code section 1106, which provides: 'Where a person purports by proper instrument to grant real property in fee simple, and subsequently acquires any title, claim of title thereto, the same passes by operation of law to the grantee, or his successors.' This statutory rule is limited to grants of fee simple and is therefore not applicable to the case at hand. The common law rule, however, survived the enactment of the statute. (1 Ogden's Revised Cal. Real Property Law, op. cit. supra, 4.20, p. 143), and is considerably broader: 'The common-law rule of after-acquired title is based upon the doctrine of estoppel, that is, that the grantor has led the grantee to believe that a certain estate or title was being conveyed. When the grantor subsequently acquires the title or estate he purported to transfer, he is estopped to deny its passage to the grantee. Therefore, the common-law rule is not limited to fee simple conveyances but applies to the transfer of any estate when the grantee initially receives a lesser interest than he was induced to believe he had received.' (2 Miller & Starr, Current Law of Cal. Real Estate (1977) Deeds, 14:56, p. 588.) Contrary to the trial court's finding, therefore, the fact that Jett did not own the property at the time he attempted to grant the easement does not prevent the defendants from asserting an interest in the land. Under the doctrine of after-acquired title, once Jett became the owner of the property, he and his successors were estopped from contesting the passage of the easement to the defendants. (6 A Powell, The Law of Real Property (1982) 927, p. 84-113; 1 Ogden's Revised Cal. Real Property Law, op. cit. supra, 13.21, pp. 552-553.)" ( Noronha v. Stewart, supra, 199 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 489-490.)