In People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, the Court held that the provision in Penal Code section 1018 that a capital defendant may enter a guilty plea only with the consent of counsel was constitutional. The court in Chadd rejected the same argument appellant makes here, that the language of Carter as quoted in Faretta indicates a defendant has a federal constitutional right requiring a court to accept his guilty plea. The court also held that the right to self-representation does not encompass a right by a defendant represented by counsel to enter a plea of guilty, and observed that a defendant's right to take the stand and confess guilt is something different than requiring a court to accept a guilty plea when it is tendered by a defendant. (Chadd, at pp. 750-754.) A guilty plea is something more than a confession of guilt; it is itself a conviction and the entry of the plea severely restricts the right of appeal. (Id. at p. 748.) In Chadd the court explained that the states have an interest in guaranteeing that a defendant pleads guilty with a full understanding of the nature and consequences of his act. In capital cases, California by statute requires that no defendant plead guilty without the consent of his counsel. In noncapital cases, California has circumscribed the right to plead guilty to protect defendants against the consequences of their own folly and neglect. Even an intelligent and voluntary plea cannot be accepted until the court is satisfied there is a factual basis for the plea. (People v. Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 748-751 & fn. 8.) A state's interest in insuring the reliability and fairness of criminal proceedings means that a state can circumscribe a defendant's right to plead guilty and can even require that the prosecution have a trial in every case. (Id. at p. 751.)