In People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, the California Supreme Court eliminated the availability of the doctrine of natural and probable consequences as a basis for aider and abettor liability for premeditated murder. (59 Cal.4th at p. 166.) The court declared, "Punishment for second degree murder is commensurate with a defendant's culpability for aiding and abetting a target crime that would naturally, probably, and foreseeably result in a murder." (Ibid.) An aider and abettor can be convicted of first degree premeditated murder only if the prosecution establishes "the defendant aided or encouraged the commission of the murder with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating its commission." (Id. at p. 167.) The court explained, "An aider and abettor who knowingly and intentionally assists a confederate to kill someone could be found to have acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, having formed his own culpable intent. Such an aider and abettor, then, acts with the mens rea required for first degree murder." (Ibid.) The Chiu court also observed that its ruling did not limit aider and abettor's liability for first degree felony murder. (Id. at p. 166.) The next issue before the Chiu court was what were the consequences of its ruling where the trial court instructed on the valid theory of direct aider and abettor liability for premeditated murder and the invalid theory based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Where, as in Chiu, a prosecutor tried the case on both theories, "defendant's first degree murder conviction must be reversed unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury based its verdict on the legally valid theory that defendant directly aided and abetted the premeditated murder." (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167.) In Chiu, because a holdout juror had been excused when she stated that she "was bothered by the principle of aiding and abetting and putting an aider and abettor in the shoes of a perpetrator," and it seemed as if the jury had focused on the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting premeditated murder, "we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury ultimately based its first degree murder verdict on a . . . legally valid theory." (Id. at p. 168.)