In People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, the California Supreme Court reviewed the circumstances in which a trial court enters into an improper plea agreement without the consent of the prosecutor who acts as the representative of the executive branch of government. (Id. at pp. 569-588.) The high court's analysis in Clancey started with the foundational point that the charging function is entrusted to the executive. Courts have no authority to substitute themselves as the People's representative in the negotiation process under the guise of plea bargaining to agree to a disposition of a case over the prosecutor's objection. (Clancey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 570.) Where, however, the defendant pleads guilty to all of the charges leaving only the pronouncement of judgment and sentencing, there is no requirement for the People to consent to a guilty plea. In such a circumstance, the court may indicate its proposed sentence with confirmation of a given set of facts, "'irrespective of whether guilt is adjudicated at trial or admitted by plea.'" (Ibid.) The prosecutor objected to the court's indicated sentence in Clancey because, outside of agreement by the People, the trial court offered to strike a prior serious felony allegations as well as on-bail enhancements, and impose a reduced sentence. (Clancey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 568-569.)