In People v. Delarosarauda (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 205, the court recognized that section 136's broad definition of victim applied to section 136.2(i)(1) postconviction domestic violence protective orders, but concluded the protective order before it could not be sustained as to persons (the defendant's son and stepdaughter) who were not assaulted during the incident. Delarosarauda states: "Under the plain language of section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), a postconviction protective order is limited to restraining the defendant from contact with a 'victim,' that is, a 'natural person with respect to whom there is reason to believe that any crime ... is being or has been perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated.' ( 136, subd. (3).) Appellant was convicted of assaulting a cohabitant. On the record before the trial court, there was no reason to believe that any crime was being or had been perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated against the children. The cohabitant testified that appellant 'never touched' the children, and no evidence suggests that appellant ever attempted to harm them. ... Thus, section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) does not provide statutory authorization for the issuance of a protective order forbidding appellant any contact with the children." (227 Cal.App.4th 211.)