People v. Douglas M

In People v. Douglas M. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1068, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child on September 8, 2006, and was placed on formal probation for seven years. (Douglas M., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071.) On October 19, 2012, the trial court modified the terms and conditions of the defendant's probation pursuant to amended section 1203.067. (Ibid.) The court in Douglas M. found that the trial court improperly modified the terms and conditions of the defendant's probation because "the provisions of revised section 1203.067 may not be applied retroactively to change the terms and conditions of probation for probationers who committed their offenses before the effective date of the amendment." (Douglas M., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070.) The court explained, "the bill was enacted in September 2010 as urgency legislation, intended to take effect immediately." (Id. at p. 1076.) However, it did not become operative until July 2012, presumably due to the required prerequisite "development and updating of standards for certification of sex offender management professionals and programs" under section 9003. (Id. at p. 1076.) "There is nothing in the legislative history that provides '"'a clear and compelling implication'"' that the Legislature intended the revised statute to apply retroactively. . . ." Given this context, the most reasonable interpretation of the language of amended section 1203.067, subdivision (b), regarding 'persons placed on formal probation prior to July 1, 2012,' is that, it applies only to those probationers whose offenses occurred between the effective date of September 9, 2010, and the operative date of July 1, 2012." (Id. at p. 1076.) Douglas M. rested its analysis on section 3 of the Penal Code, which provides that "'no part of the Penal Code is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.' Our Supreme Court has 'described section 3 . . . as codifying "the time-honored principle . . . that in the absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature . . . must have intended a retroactive application." In applying this principle, we have been cautious not to infer retroactive intent from vague phrases and broad, general language in statutes. Consequently, "'a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed . . . to be unambiguously prospective.'"'" (Douglas M., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1075.)