In People v. Eid (2014) 59 Cal.4th 650, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant who was charged with one offense was properly convicted by a jury of two lesser included offenses, where neither of the two lesser offenses was included in the other. Eid based its decision on Penal Code section 1159, as construed in light of the "truth-ascertainment function" which guides a trial court's duty to instruct on lesser included offenses. In Eid, defendants Reynoldo Eid and Alaor Oliveira were charged with two counts of the kidnapping for ransom of Ana and Iago Ribeiro. ( 209, subd. (b).) The evidence at trial established that Jefferson Ribeiro, Ana's husband and Iago's father, traveled from Brazil to Florida on a six-month tourist visa. Jefferson, however, planned to stay in the United States indefinitely. Less than a year later, Jefferson met Mauricio Freitas, who agreed to arrange for Ana and Iago to illegally enter the United States in exchange for $18,000. Jefferson paid Freitas $4,000 and was to pay the remaining balance in monthly installments of $1,000. Pursuant to that agreement, Ana and Iago flew from Brazil to Mexico City, and were eventually smuggled across the border into the United States. The defendants kept Ana and Iago in a motel room in Costa Mesa. In the meantime, Freitas repeatedly asked Jefferson for more money, and Jefferson paid him approximately $13,000 in additional cash. Eid then called Jefferson and demanded $14,000 more. Jefferson had no more money and did not agree to the demand. Eid said he would not release Ana and Iago, took their passports, and threatened to take Ana to New York and make her work to pay off the debt if the defendants were not paid. Thereafter, Jefferson located the motel where his son and wife were being held and sent a friend who lived locally to pick them up. When the friend arrived, the defendants refused to allow Ana and Iago to leave and the police were called. The police arrested the defendants and Ana informed police she had been held against her will. (Eid, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 652-654.) In addition to being instructed on the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the jury was also instructed on four lesser included offenses. The jurors were informed that they could find the defendants guilty of a lesser crime if they found the defendants not guilty of the charged crime. The jury found the defendants not guilty on the kidnapping for ransom charges, but guilty of two lesser offenses--attempted extortion and misdemeanor false imprisonment. The defendants did not object to being convicted of the two lesser offenses, but argued for the first time on appeal that they could not be convicted of two lesser included offenses from one greater offense. (Eid, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 655.) The Court of Appeal agreed and struck the convictions for misdemeanor false imprisonment. The California Supreme Court granted review and reversed the Court of Appeal's decision. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court determined that multiple convictions for lesser included offenses, when not included in each other, are statutorily authorized under section 1159 when a defendant is charged with one offense. "Section 1159 provides that 'the jury ... may find the defendant guilty of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged . ...'" (Eid, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 656.) The words "any offense" in the statute are susceptible of a singular or plural meaning in common usage, the court explained, depending upon the context. When "any" is considered in the framework of the jury's "truth-ascertainment function," a jury is statutorily allowed to return multiple guilty verdicts to reflect the jury's determination of the defendant's criminal culpability, even if only one offense was charged in the first instance. (Id. at pp. 656-659.) The court reiterated the rationale for instructing a jury on lesser included offenses: "A jury instructed on only the charged offense might be tempted to convict the defendant '"of a greater offense than that established by the evidence"' rather than acquit the defendant altogether, or it may be forced to acquit the defendant because the charged crime is not proven even though the '"evidence is sufficient to establish a lesser included offense."' . Instructing the jury on lesser included offenses avoids presenting the jury with 'an "unwarranted all-or-nothing choice"' citation, thereby 'protecting both the defendant and the prosecution against a verdict contrary to the evidence' citation." (Eid, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 657.) The court then determined that "the purposes underlying the rule requiring instruction on lesser included offenses are served by allowing the jury to convict on more than one lesser offense if, in the jury's determination, such convictions more accurately reflect the defendant's culpability in light of the evidence." (Eid, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 657.) As applied to the Eid case, the jury's decision to convict the defendants of attempted extortion and misdemeanor false imprisonment instead of kidnapping for ransom "acknowledged that although defendants had not kidnapped the victims and held them for ransom, they had held the victims against their will and attempted to extort money from their family. By convicting defendants of two lesser included offenses, the jury tailored its verdict to reflect its determination of the full extent of defendants' criminal acts." (Ibid.)