In People v. Glee (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 99, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to prove an allegation that his prior conviction for assault with a firearm constituted a serious felony within the meaning of Penal Code section 667, subdivision (d). The record of the prior conviction reflected that the defendant had entered a guilty plea to the assault count in exchange for "the promise that his sentence would be 'a grant of probation, with a year in the county jail, with probation to terminate at the end of that year,'" and the promised sentence had been imposed. (Glee at p. 101.) The Glee court concluded that the sentencing court's imposition of a sentence for the assault offense of one year in county jail and one year of summary probation to terminate at the end of the jail term was a "misdemeanor sentence" that "automatically converted" the assault offense to a misdemeanor. (Glee at pp. 102-105.) Since Penal Code section 667, subdivision (d) provided that the felony nature of a conviction "is not affected by the sentence imposed unless the sentence automatically, upon the initial sentencing, converts the felony to a misdemeanor," the Glee court concluded that the defendant's assault offense did not qualify as a prior felony conviction under that statute. (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (d), Glee at pp. 102-105.) In reaching this conclusion, the Glee court distinguished cases where imposition of judgment had been suspended, "the defendant was ordered to serve jail time as a condition of probation and some portion of the probationary period remained after the defendant's release from jail." (Glee at p. 103.) The Glee court believed that such cases were distinguishable from the case before it because the facts of these other cases demonstrated that the sentencing courts in those cases intended to impose felony sentences whereas the sentence imposed on Glee reflected the sentencing court's intent to impose a misdemeanor sentence. The Glee court specifically noted that Glee had been informed "that his sentence would be one year in the county jail with probation to terminate upon his release from the county jail" and that Glee had only needed to serve 36 days in custody after sentencing before the termination of his probation due to his accumulated credits. In addition, Glee had not been informed when he entered his plea that a violation of his probation could result in the imposition of a state prison term. (Glee at pp. 104-105.) The Glee court found that "this record supports the inference that the sentencing court did not intend to retain jurisdiction over appellant with the possibility of later imposing a prison sentence." (Glee at p. 105, ) This inferred intent, in the Glee court's view, triggered a presumption that the sentencing court had intended to impose a misdemeanor sentence thereby automatically converting the offense to a misdemeanor. (Glee at p. 105.)