In People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, the California Supreme Court concluded the ATES evidence in that case was properly authenticated, was not testimonial, and did not constitute hearsay. In Goldsmith, a notice to appear was issued to the defendant pursuant to the City of Inglewood's implementation of an ATES. (Id. at p. 264.) The citation alleged the defendant failed to stop at a red traffic light. (Ibid.) The defendant challenged the citation. (Ibid.) The only witness at trial was an Inglewood Police Department investigator, who testified he was assigned to the traffic division in red light camera enforcement and had more than six years of experience in that assignment. (Ibid.) The investigator testified the defendant's citation was the result of the red light camera program first implemented in 2003, and the City of Inglewood's ATES, though operated by the police department, was maintained by Redflex. (Ibid.) "Based on his experience and the knowledge that he acquired from city engineers regarding how the traffic signals and system work and from Redflex regarding how the ATES works, the investigator testified that the computer-based digital camera system operates 'independently' and records events occurring within an intersection after the traffic signal has turned red. The investigator stated that the ATES information is stored as it is 'reported' on the hard disc of a computer at the scene. According to the investigator, Redflex technicians retrieve that computerized information periodically throughout the day through an Internet connection. A police officer then reviews all photographs before a citation is printed or mailed." (Ibid.) The investigator then explained in detail how the photographs and video images are recorded and produced by the ATES. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 264.) He explained the ATES camera produces three photographs. (Ibid.) The first photograph showed the vehicle at or before the crosswalk or limit line for the intersection with the traffic signal shown in the background during its red phase. (Ibid.) The second photograph showed the vehicle within the intersection either in the process of making a right turn or going straight through the intersection, and the third photograph showed the vehicle's license plate. (Id. at pp. 264-265.) A data bar imprinted on all of the photographs by the ATES showed the date, time, location, and length of time in which the light had been red at the time of the photograph. (Id. at p. 265.) In addition, a 12-second video shows the approach and progression of the vehicle through the intersection. (Ibid.) Based on the ATES evidence, the investigator testified to the specific facts surrounding the defendant's traffic violation. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 265.) The trial court overruled the defendant's objections to the investigator's testimony and, based on the evidence, found beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant failed to stop at a red light. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion approving the authentication used in the trial court. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266.) The Supreme Court started with the proposition that photographs and video recordings imprinted with data are writings which must be authenticated before they may be admitted in evidence (id. at pp. 266-267), and a photograph or video recording typically is authenticated by showing "it is a fair and accurate representation of the scene depicted" (id. at p. 267). Such authentication may be provided by a presumption. (Id. at p. 268.) Evidence Code sections 1552 and 1553 provide presumptions for the existence and content of computer information and digital images that the printed versions purport to represent. (Goldsmith, supra, at p. 268.) These presumptions apply to images and data generated by ATES and support a finding, in the absence of contrary evidence, that "the printed versions of ATES images and data are accurate representations of the images and data stored in the ATES equipment." (Id. at p. 269.) These presumptions do not violate a defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses. (Id. at pp. 269-270.) The Supreme Court explained the presumptions of Evidence Code sections 1552 and 1553 do not in themselves fully supply the necessary foundation for admission of ATES evidence, and it is necessary to authenticate the evidence in compliance with Evidence Code section 1401. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 271.) The court concluded the investigator's testimony provided the necessary authentication: "The investigator's testimony was adequate to show that the ATES photographs at issue were from Inglewood's ATES equipment located at the corner of Centinela and Beach Avenues. From his explanation regarding the independent operation of the ATES camera system, it can be reasonably inferred that the ATES system automatically and contemporaneously recorded the images of the intersection and the data imprinted on the photographs when it was triggered. The investigator was not asked anything about the city's or the police department's records or supervision of Redflex's maintenance or certification of the equipment. Defendant does not argue that the investigator's testimony was insufficient to demonstrate that the evidence was properly received in the normal course and manner of Inglewood's operation of its ATES program. Finally, we note that the content of the photographs themselves may be considered and here the content supplied further support for a finding that the images were genuine." (Id. at p. 271, fn. omitted.) The court rejected the defendant's argument that testimony of a Redflex technician or another witness with special expertise in the operation and maintenance of the ATES computers was required to authenticate the ATES evidence. (Id. at p. 272.) The Supreme Court also concluded the ATES evidence did not constitute hearsay. (Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 273-274.) "The ATES-generated photographs and video introduced here as substantive evidence of defendant's infraction are not statements of a person as defined by the Evidence Code. . Therefore, they do not constitute hearsay as statutorily defined." (Id. at p. 274.) Since ATES evidence is not hearsay, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's confrontation clause claims. (Id. at p. 275.)