People v. Heishman

In People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, the defendant was charged with murdering a woman to prevent her from testifying that he had raped her. (Id. at pp. 156-157.) Nancy Gentry, a woman with whom the defendant was romantically involved, testified she drove the defendant to the victim's home, lured the victim outside, and drove the defendant from the scene after the murder. (Id. at pp. 158-159.) The defendant's theory at trial was that Gentry killed the victim, acting on her own. (Id. at p. 162.) The jury was given the following instructions regarding the difference between a perpetrator and an accomplice, and the requirement for corroboration of an accomplice's testimony: "The jury instructions defined principals as including those who directly and actively commit the crime and those who aid and abet in its commission with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the one who does directly and actively commit it (the perpetrator). As to accomplices, the jury was instructed: 'An accomplice is one who is or was subject to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial. To be an accomplice, the person must have aided, promoted, encouraged, or instigated by act or advice the commission of such offense with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the person who committed the offense.' (CALJIC No. 3.10 (1979 rev.).) 'In the crime of murder, if the crime of murder was committed by anyone, the witness Nancy Gentry was an accomplice as a matter of law and her testimony is subject to the rule requiring corroboration.' (CALJIC No. 3.16, bracketed words added by the court.)" (Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 162.) On appeal following his conviction, the defendant argued, based on the instructions quoted above, that "the jury was thereby directed to find that Gentry was an accomplice in the sense of one who assists another and was precluded from finding that she acted alone." (Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 162.) The California Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that Gentry could be both an accomplice and the actual killer: "The instructions did not literally tell the jury it could not find Gentry was the killer. And Gentry was legally an accomplice 'if the crime of murder was committed by anyone' including Gentry herself. CALJIC No. 3.16 was given to make clear that Gentry was being labeled an accomplice for purposes of the rule requiring corroboration if her testimony were believed. The instruction could not reasonably be understood as precluding rejection of her testimony--including rejection based on a conclusion that in fact she was the killer. Defendant's interpretation of the instruction would make it practically a direction of conviction. Yet the jury was fully instructed on the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 162-163.)