In People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, the California Supreme Court concluded that the instruction on section 1108 evidence "could have been better" but "did not mislead the jury in any fashion prejudicial to defendant." (Id. at p. 77.) The instruction told the jurors that if they could find, by a preponderance of the evidence (which was not defined), that defendant committed a prior sexual offense, they could, but were not required to, infer that defendant had a disposition to commit the same or similar type of sexual offense, and if that inference was made, they could, but were not required to, infer that defendant was likely to and did commit the charged sexual offense. (Id. at p. 71.) The high court rejected defendant's contention that this instruction informed the jurors that they could convict defendant of the charged murder solely on the evidence of the prior sexual offense, violating the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at pp. 72, 76.) The court reasoned, "The instructions never told 'the jury it may rest a conviction solely on evidence of prior offenses.' . . . Because of the instructions the jury heard concerning the reasonable doubt standard of proof, 'no reasonable juror would believe those requirements could be satisfied solely by proof of uncharged offenses.' . . . . . . The instruction merely told the jury it could 'infer' from defendant's prior sexual crimes that he committed the charged crime. It did not say such an inference itself constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was also instructed that 'an inference is a deduction that can logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts established by the evidence.' But a logical deduction is not the same as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The instructions given 'provide only that an inference of guilt may be drawn from prior offenses that have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. They do not suggest that an inference so drawn is sufficient for a finding of guilt. The jury still had to find that the facts of the charged crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Reviewing the instructions in this case as a whole bolsters this conclusion. . . . The court instructed repetitively and in detail on the reasonable doubt standard. . . . The court also instructed the jury there had to be a union or joint operation of act or conduct and the required intent." (Id. at pp. 74-76.) The high court in Loy also rejected the defendant's argument that the instruction permitted the jury to convict him based on the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to the section 1108 evidence, rather than on the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, saying, "The trial court merely told the jury it could not consider the evidence of the prior sexual crimes for any purpose unless it found that he had committed them by a preponderance of the evidence. Nothing in that instruction cancelled the reasonable doubt instruction . . . ." (Id. at p. 76.)