In People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020, the prisoner seeking resentencing was serving a three strikes sentence after having been convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, but the People did not allege he was armed with a firearm at the time or allege a sentence enhancement based on being armed with a firearm.(Osuna, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1027.) As the Osuna court noted, "possessing a firearm does not necessarily constitute being armed with a firearm." (225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1030.) The trial court denied the prisoner's petition for resentencing, concluding he was ineligible because he was armed with a firearm during the commission of his offense. (Id. at p. 1028.) The appellate court concluded the record contained evidence that the prisoner "had a firearm available for offensive or defensive use" during the commission of his offense because he "was actually holding a handgun." (Id. at p. 1030.) "Thus, factually he was 'armed with a firearm' within the meaning of the Act." (Ibid.) The prisoner argued he was not ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(2), because a finding of being armed with a firearm had to be tethered to an underlying conviction or, phrased differently, there had to be a "'facilitative nexus'" between the arming and the possession. (Osuna, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1030.) The appellate court agreed that tethering and a facilitative nexus are required when imposing an "'armed with a firearm'" sentence enhancement under section 12022. (Osuna, at pp. 1030-1031.) The court then wrote: "However, unlike section 12022, which requires that a defendant be armed 'in the commission of' a felony for additional punishment to be imposed (italics added), the Act disqualifies an inmate from eligibility for lesser punishment if he or she was armed with a firearm 'during the commission of' the current offense (italics added). 'During' is variously defined as 'throughout the continuance or course of' or 'at some point in the course of.' . In other words, it requires a temporal nexus between the arming and the underlying felony, not a facilitative one. The two are not the same. ." (Id. at p. 1032.) Ultimately, the Osuna court concluded that, "since the Act uses the phrase 'during the commission of the current offense,' and not 'in the commission of the current offense' ( 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii)), and since at issue is not the imposition of additional punishment but rather eligibility for reduced punishment . . . the literal language of the Act disqualifies an inmate from resentencing if he or she was armed with a firearm during the unlawful possession of that firearm." (Ibid.) In other words, the Osuna court explicitly rejected the approach defendant urges us to adopt, because it held that a defendant may be found ineligible for resentencing on the ground that he was armed with a firearm even if his being armed did not further the crime that led to a third strike conviction. Even though the prisoner's "having the firearm available for use did not further his illegal possession of it," the fact that a firearm was available for use was sufficient to render the defendant ineligible for resentencing under the provision of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iii), that pertains to ineligibility of defendants who were "armed with a firearm" "'during the commission of the current offense.'" (Osuna, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1032.)