People v. Palafox

In People v. Palafox (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 68, the trial court sentenced a juvenile defendant convicted of special circumstance murder to life without possibility of parole under section 190.5, subdivision (b). Section 190.5, subdivision (b), provides: "The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree, in any case in which one or more special circumstances enumerated in Section 190.2 or 190.25 has been found to be true under Section 190.4, who was 16 years of age or older and under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the crime, shall be confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole or, at the discretion of the court, 25 years to life." On appeal, Palafox argued there was Miller error because the trial court said it was not excluding the possibility he could be rehabilitated. But the Court of Appeal reasoned: "The trial court . . . did not find defendant had a significant chance of rehabilitation; it simply refused to rule out the possibility. Because no one can see into the future or predict it with any accuracy, presumably there is always the possibility of rehabilitation -- however remote -- where a juvenile is concerned. That is the point of Miller. Despite this, Miller did not say the possibility of rehabilitation overrides all other relevant factors. If the potential for rehabilitation were dispositive -- or even the preeminent factor -- we do not believe the high court would simply have listed the possibility of rehabilitation as one of several factors applicable to an individualized determination whether to impose life without possibility of parole (LWOP) on a juvenile offender. Rather, the court would have held LWOP categorically unconstitutional for juvenile offenders, or at least would have explicitly said such a sentence cannot constitutionally stand in face of a potential for rehabilitation." (People v. Palafox, supra, at p. 90.) Palafox concluded, "The trial court here thoughtfully weighed the applicable factors, particularly defendant's youth and its attendant circumstances, and implicitly concluded defendant was unfit ever to reenter society. We cannot say it exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered . . . ." (Id. at p. 91.)