In People v. Quesada (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 533, the First District Court of Appeal applied the reasoning of Piorkowski, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d 324 to a homicide committed while the defendant attempted to apprehend a person suspected of burglarizing his unoccupied home two days earlier. The defendant engaged others to buy a stereo from the suspect, confirmed the stereo had been stolen from his apartment, and tried to make an arrest. When the suspect drove away, the defendant shot and killed him. (Quesada, supra, at pp. 536-537.) The court held the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that "homicide is justifiable 'when necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and means, to apprehend any person who has committed burglary of the first degree.'" (Id. at p. 537.) The court explained that "since a burglary committed when no one is on the premises is not a crime which threatens death or serious bodily harm so as to justify the use of deadly force in preventing its occurrence," for example, one may not justifiably use a trap gun to prevent a burglary (People v. Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470), "it would seem to follow that it is not, or at least not per se, the sort of crime which justifies the use of deadly force by a citizen in apprehending the criminal. In the latter case, as well as the former, the modern common law rule limits the use of deadly force to 'dangerous' felonies: 'The law does not permit the use of deadly force for the mere purpose of preventing a nondangerous felony, and a private person cannot defeat this restriction merely by saying his or her purpose is arrest rather than prevention.' ." (Quesada, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at p. 539.)