In People v. Quinones (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1040, a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of possession for sale of heroin, one count of transportation of a controlled substance, and possession by a convicted felon of a firearm, and found he was personally armed with a firearm during the drug offenses, and had two prior strike convictions. (Quinones, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1042.) At sentencing, the court "struck the arming allegation 'at this time as being unnecessary' but imposed a sentence on the felon-in-possession charge, noting 'this was a pistol in this case, which was in his possession at the time' of the drug offenses." (Ibid.) The court then sentenced the defendant to a term of 75 years to life. (Ibid.) The defendant filed a petition to recall his sentence under the Act, asserting his current felonies were not serious or violent. (Quinones, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1042.) Because the sentencing court had "'struck the enhancement allegations completely'", the defendant posited that "the arming allegation was not part of his record of conviction and he was eligible under the Act." (Ibid.) In opposition, the People argued "the arming allegation had been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury, and had been stricken for sentencing purposes only, and therefore under the Act it disqualified defendant from relief." (Id. at p. 1042, fn. omitted.) The trial court denied the defendant's petition for resentencing, "finding defendant ineligible under the Act because he possessed a firearm during the current offenses, notwithstanding that the sentencing judge struck the arming enhancement at defendant's 1996 sentencing." (Id. at p. 1043.) The Quinones court concluded that the trial court correctly found the defendant was ineligible for resentencing based on the court's determination that "the current offense fell within the bar of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iii), and section 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii), each of which describes the circumstance where 'during the commission of the current offense, the defendant ... was armed with a firearm or deadly weapon ....'" (Quinones, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1044.) The court explained: "The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of the offenses, and the sentencing judge suggested the same during the sentencing proceeding. In the course of declining to strike one or both strikes, the sentencing judge found defendant was sophisticated, given inter alia the amount of heroin he possessed and the fact that he possessed a pistol .... Thus, apparently given the lengthy three strikes sentence imposed ... the sentencing judge found the additional term for the firearm enhancement to be 'unnecessary' and declined to impose it. But that does not change the fact that defendant was armed with a firearm during the commission of the current offenses. Nothing in the record on appeal suggests any legal infirmity with the enhancement, such as a lack of evidentiary support, or other legal defect." (Id. at p. 1044.)